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RECONSIDERING REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY:      
MAKING A CASE FOR ENERGY STORAGE 
AMY L. STEIN* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article begins the complex dialogue that must take place to address the emerging 
technologies providing energy storage for our electricity grid. Energy storage has the 
capacity to be a game-changer for many facets of our grid, providing better integration of 
renewable energy, enhanced reliability, and reduced use of carbon-intensive fuels. Energy 
storage faces a number of obstacles, however, including technological, financial, and 
regulatory uncertainty. This Article focuses on the regulatory uncertainty, and defends the 
proposition that not all regulatory uncertainty is created equal. It argues for differential 
treatment of this uncertainty, depending on its context, scope, and source, and applies this 
framework to the uncertainty surrounding the classification of energy storage. It finds that 
this uncertainty operates against high baseline levels of uncertainty in the energy industry, 
is limited in its scope, and is intentionally embraced by the federal regulators in an effort to 
realize the benefits of regulatory uncertainty. This Article asserts that this form of 
uncertainty is one that can be managed in a way to avoid stifling the development of this 
important technology. This Article sets forth strategies for regulators and regulated entities 
to continue to function, even within this zone of regulatory uncertainty. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Few people think about electricity and grid reliability until they 
lose power. “There have been five massive [electricity] blackouts [in 
the United States] over the past 40 years, three of which have 
occurred in the past nine years.”1 In 2003, the United States suffered 
its largest blackout in history, affecting about forty-five million 
people and costing approximately six billion dollars in losses.2 Nine 
nuclear power plants shut down, cities were left without water, 
flights were grounded, and traffic chaos ensued in rush hour without 
traffic signals.3 In the summer of 2011, Texas barely avoided rolling 
blackouts, and only by paying up to thirty times the normal price of 
electricity.4 The Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that power 
outages and interruptions cost Americans more than 150 billion 
dollars each year.5 Extreme weather events associated with climate 
change, combined with aging energy infrastructure, suggests that the 
frequency of such blackouts is likely to increase before it decreases.6  
 In addition to power disruptions, our grid is plagued by a number 
of inefficiencies. Within our current grid, electricity must be used 
instantaneously, meaning there is tremendous pressure on our 
nation’s grid operators to ensure that the demand (or load) is 
constantly in equal balance with the supply.7 This has led to a 
 1. LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC’N, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN 
INTRODUCTION 7, available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/Documentsand 
Media/ DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages(1).pdf (prepared for the U.S. Dep’t of Energy). 
 2. Id. at 8-9. 
 3. Jaime Holguin, Biggest Blackout in U.S. History, CBS NEWS (Aug. 15, 2003), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/biggest-blackout-in-us-history. 
 4. Packing Some Power, ECONOMIST (May 3, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21548495. 
 5. LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC’N, supra note 1, at 5. 
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER 2-3, 35 (2013), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/07/ 
f2/20130710-Energy-Sector-Vulnerabilities-Report.pdf; Superstorm Sandy: More Than 7 
Million Without Power, CBS NEWS (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/           
superstorm-sandy-more-than-7-million-without-power/ (noting Superstorm Sandy left 7.9 
million customers across the Mid-Atlantic States and New England without power). 
 7. Regulatory Organizations, W. FARMERS ELEC. COOP., http://www.wfec.com/      
operations/governing-bodies (last visited June 14, 2014) (“Unlike water or gas, electricity 
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preference for baseload sources that can run at near one-hundred 
percent capacity and expensive construction and maintenance of 
“peaker plants,” which are power plants that are only called upon for 
a few hours each day to cover the large disparity between off-peak 
and on-peak electricity demands.8 Additionally, millions of potential 
megawatt-hours of electricity generation from intermittent 
renewable energy resources like wind and solar are wasted due to 
transmission constraints.9 This wasted renewable energy is 
particularly ironic, given our nation’s efforts to better integrate 
renewable energy into our electricity portfolio10 and to reduce the 
conventional pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions emitted from 
fossil fuels.11 
 Although these costs and inefficiencies are diverse, they all can be 
addressed through one technology: energy storage. Energy storage in 
this context refers not to the storage of a primary fuel such as 
natural gas, but the energy storage of previously generated electric 
energy (potential, kinetic, chemical, or thermal energy) to be released 
at a later time. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
defines an energy storage asset as “property that is interconnected to 
the electrical grid and is designed to receive electrical energy, to store 
such electrical energy as another energy form, and to convert such 
energy back to electricity and deliver such electricity for sale, or to 
use such energy to provide reliability or economic benefits to the 
cannot be stored. It must be generated as it is needed, and supply must be kept in balance 
with demand.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Abby Gruen, ‘Peakers’ Plants Provide Electricity When It’s Hot, but at the 
Highest Price, STAR-LEDGER (July 20, 2010, 2:51 PM), http://www.nj.com/business/       
index.ssf/2010/07/peakers_plants_provide_electri.html (explaining that “peakers” are 
comparatively expensive to operate, costing ratepayers thirteen million dollars annually to 
keep a single peaker plant in New Jersey operational). 
 9. See, e.g., William Pentland, Transmission Bottlenecks Bad News for Renewable 
Energy, FORBES (May 3, 2011, 11:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/ 
2011/05/03/transmission-bottlenecks-bad-news-for-renewable-energy/ (“In some areas 
where the constraints are especially acute like Oregon and Washington State, the lack of 
spare transmission capacity could force wind farms that have already been built to shut 
down on a rolling basis in the near future.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks by 
the President on Climate Change at Georgetown University (June 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change 
(“Today, I'm directing the Interior Department to green light enough private, renewable 
energy capacity on public lands to power more than 6 million homes by 2020.”). 
 11. See U.S. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–
2011, at 3-5 to -7 (2013) [hereinafter EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS]; Clean Energy: Air Emissions, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2013) (“Fossil 
fuel-fired power plants are responsible for 67 percent of the nation’s sulfur dioxide 
emissions, 23 percent of nitrogen oxide emissions, and 40 percent of man-made carbon 
dioxide emissions.”). 
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grid.”12 By eliminating the historical limitation of the grid requiring 
instantaneous use, energy storage has the potential to drastically 
alter the way the electricity grid functions.13 
 Some forms of energy storage, such as pumped hydropower 
storage, have been the historic face of bulk energy storage14 for over a 
hundred years.15 But the world is bracing for the next generation of 
bulk energy storage to address reliability, economic efficiency, and 
environmental issues plaguing the electric grid. In addition to 
pumped hydropower storage, this next generation will expand to 
include some combination of batteries, flywheels, fuel cells, 
superconducting magnets, and compressed air energy storage. 
 While these emerging technologies bring great promise, they also 
bring great uncertainty. There is uncertainty about the specific 
technologies that will be cost-effective for the grid, the market forces 
that will drive energy investments, the legal and regulatory 
 12. Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting and Financial Reporting 
for New Electric Storage Technologies, Order No. 784, 144 FERC ¶ 61,056, ¶ 172 (July 18, 
2013) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 784]; see also CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ELECTRIC 
ENERGY STORAGE: AN ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 2-3 
(2010), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/71859AF5-2D26-4262-BF52-
62DE85C0 E942/0/CPUCStorageWhitePaper7910.pdf (“[Electric energy] storage can be 
defined as: a set of technologies capable of storing previously generated electric energy and 
releasing that energy at a later time. EES technologies may store electrical energy as 
potential, kinetic, chemical, or thermal energy, and include various types of batteries, 
flywheels, electrochemical capacitors, compressed air storage, thermal storage devices and 
pumped hydroelectric power.”).  
 13. In fact, some utilities view energy storage as a “disruptive force.” PETER KIND, 
EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/Documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf. Although one 
could only imagine utilities as obsolete if there was a fully viable distributed energy 
alternative, a prospect that does not seem feasible in the short-term, the same was 
probably said about telephone customers not being able to “cut the cord” from their phone 
company, yet now many have chosen to go completely cellular. Id. at 5. There are many 
similarities between the energy grid and the telecommunications network, see Amy L. 
Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217 (2012), and plummeting 
profits on the road to such “disruptive” transitions is one similarity that they may not 
choose to share. 
 14. Bulk energy “refers to the network of interconnected generation and transmission 
lines, while the distribution system refers to the lower-voltage generally radial lines that 
deliver electricity to the final customer.” 4 NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., BULK 
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: OPERATIONS AND TRANSMISSION PLANNING 22-1 (2012), 
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52409-4.pdf. 
 15. There is approximately twenty-two gigawatts (GW) of pumped-storage 
hydropower (PSH) deployed in the United States across forty sites, most of which was 
developed between 1970 and 1990. Pumped Storage Provides Grid Reliability Even with 
Net Loss, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 8, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/                    
detail.cfm?id=11991; see also PAUL DENHOLM ET AL.,  NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., THE 
ROLE OF ENERGY STORAGE WITH RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY GENERATION 7-8 (2010), 
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47187.pdf.  
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environment into which energy storage will be thrust, and their 
integration into resource adequacy and transmission planning.16 This 
Article does not purport to tackle all of this uncertainty, but focuses 
on the regulatory uncertainty facing energy storage entities.17 To 
simplify syntax, however, this Article will refer to “regulatory 
uncertainty” as “uncertainty” wherever possible. 
 One of the most fundamental uncertainties surrounds whether 
energy storage is treated as a generation, transmission, or 
distribution asset, a classification that affects jurisdictional and cost-
recovery determinations.18 Such uncertainties are regularly cited as 
barriers to energy storage development,19 as they are in many other 
 16. For instance, grid operators may be most affected by the technological uncertainty 
of the response time, duration, and availability of energy storage and their integration into 
resource adequacy and transmission planning.  
 17. Christian Engau & Volker H. Hoffmann, Corporate Response Strategies to 
Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence from Uncertainty About Post-Kyoto Regulation, 44 POL’Y 
SCI. 53, 54 (2011) (“[T]he term ‘regulatory uncertainty’ . . . refer[s] to uncertainty 
associated with the actions of governmental agencies that create and enforce regulations 
and [is] define[d] . . . as a firm’s ‘inability to predict the future state of the regulatory 
environment.’ ” (internal citations omitted)); Frances J. Milliken, Three Types of Perceived 
Uncertainty About the Environment: State, Effect, and Response Uncertainty, 12 ACAD. OF 
MGMT. REV. 133, 136 (1987). This definition is not entirely unsatisfactory, proposing to 
encompass almost any situation where regulated entities cannot predict the future. A 
better definition may be ambiguity caused by agency inaction, delays, changes in 
leadership, inconsistencies, vagueness, or similar actions. 
 18. The traditional public utility model operates on a system of cost-of-service 
ratemaking, whereby a public utility commission (PUC) approves a rate that a utility may 
charge its customers based on a base rate, multiplied by a rate of return and operating 
costs. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, COST OF SERVICE RATES MANUAL 6-7 (1999), 
available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/gen-info/cost-of-service-manual.doc. Energy 
assets receive unusual regulatory treatment in most states because they are regulated as a 
natural monopoly, in which energy providers charge customers in their territory a rate set 
by the state (or, for wholesale transmission, FERC), and the state must approve decisions 
about what infrastructure and other costs the providers may recover through the rates. See 
infra Part III. 
 19. See ANITA LUONG, AM. INST. OF CHEM. ENG’RS, GRID SCALE ENERGY STORAGE: 
ADDRESSING THE REGULATORY AND POLICY BARRIERS 21 (2011), available at 
http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2011/documents/ALuong_Final_GridScaleEnergyStorage_ 
2nded.pdf (“Regulatory barriers are the main challenges that deployment of grid-scale 
energy storage face.”); Thomas P. Lyon & Jing Li, Regulatory Uncertainty and      
Regulatory Scope 3 (July 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228416428_Regulatory_uncertainty_and_regulato
ry_scope/file/79e4150ed778a9549a.pdf (“[T]he former chairman of the Massachusetts 
Public Utilities Commission lament[ed] the fact that ‘[a] wide range of tools is available . . . 
to enhance grid flexibility. Uptake of these technologies, however, has languished in an 
environment of regulatory uncertainty.’ ”); Rick Drom, Andrews Kurth LLP, Critical 
Drivers for Utility-Scale Renewable Energy 18 (Jan. 19, 2011) (PowerPoint presentation), 
available at http://www.acore.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/smart-grid-regulatory-
Drom.pdf (“Regulatory certainty is necessary to reduce investor risk and provide for 
continued development of Energy Storage technologies.”). 
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emerging technology contexts.20 For instance, the DOE notes that 
“[r]egulatory issues at the federal and state level may limit the value 
proposition for energy storage and removing them may be necessary 
to level the playing field with other technologies.”21 “Overall, the 
value of storage is highly system-dependent, location-dependent, and 
subject to risk and uncertainty; technical, regulatory, and 
financial.”22 State legislators and regulators make similar 
statements, as exemplified by California’s recent energy storage bill23 
and accompanying California Public Utility Commission orders.24  
 Instead of clarifying this uncertainty, FERC explicitly embraced 
it, pointing to the fact-specific nature of the inquiry required of 
energy storage technologies, technologies that are capable of 
performing any and all of the functions traditionally attributed to 
generation, transmission, and distribution assets.25 Stakeholders 
criticize the resulting uncertainty and argue that lingering ambiguity 
surrounding such fundamental issues can stifle investments in 
 20. See City of Dearborn v. Comcast of Michigan III, Inc., No. 08-10156, 2008 WL 
4534167, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2008) (“The rise in cable television technology initially 
created legislative and regulatory uncertainty.” (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 
529 F.3d 763, 767 (6th Cir. 2008))); Robert Falkner & Nico Jaspers, Regulating 
Nanotechnologies: Risk, Uncertainty and the Global Governance Gap, 12 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
POL. 30, 31 (discussing regulatory challenges in the burgeoning field of nanotechnology); 
Alfred A. Marcus, Policy Uncertainty and Technological Innovation, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
443, 443-44 (1981) (exploring the effects of regulatory uncertainty on the development of 
then-emerging technologies such as cogeneration and the use of composite fuels made of 
pulverized coal); Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable 
Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1691 (2012) (“Regulatory uncertainty is an obvious and 
significant barrier to consistent investor confidence in renewable energy.”); Kevin Drum, 
Carbon Pricing and Regulatory Uncertainty, MOTHER JONES (July 26, 2010), 
http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/07/carbon-pricing-and-regulatory-uncertainty. 
 21. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANALYTIC CHALLENGES TO VALUING ENERGY STORAGE 2 
(2011). 
 22. Id. at 3. 
 23. A.B. 2514, 2009 Leg., 10th Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (amending CAL. PUB. RES.    
CODE § 2536 (West 2009) & CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 454.3, 9615, 9620 (West 2009)), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_2501-2550/ab_2514_bill_ 
20100820_amended_sen_v90.html [hereinafter Cal. A.B. 2514] (“There are significant 
barriers to obtaining the benefits of energy storage systems, including . . . inadequate 
statutory and regulatory support.”).  
 24. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to  Assembly Bill 
2514 to Consider the Rulemaking 10-12-007 at 3 (Dec. 16, 2010), available at 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M065/K706/65706057.PDF (identifying 
the “[l]ack of cohesive regulatory framework” as one of the primary barriers to energy 
storage). 
 25. Eric Wesoff, FERC’s Commissioner on Energy Storage, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 
18, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-view-from-ferc-on-energy-
storage/.  
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energy storage and disrupt the long-term planning involved in such 
capital-intensive endeavors.26  
 Investment in energy storage need not be stifled by regulatory 
uncertainty. In fact, FERC’s embrace of ambiguity with respect to 
energy storage provides an opportunity to reconsider the role of this 
uncertainty. This evaluation demonstrates that there are multiple 
varieties of uncertainty with differing degrees of impacts. This 
multifaceted view of uncertainty—along a spectrum—suggests that 
the responses may be similarly varied. This Article does not claim to 
resolve the uncertainty associated with energy storage, but instead 
argues that the uncertainty is manageable, and perhaps even 
beneficial to an emerging technology. To this end, this Article also 
sets forth a path toward resolving the uncertainty.  
 Part II of this Article explores the fundamentals of energy storage 
and its attendant uncertainty. This Part provides a flavor for the 
various energy storage technologies that make up this catchall term. 
It explains the multiple functions and value streams of energy 
storage that contribute to their complicated legal status. It then 
analyzes the fundamental uncertainty surrounding FERC’s 
treatment of bulk energy storage as a generation or a transmission 
asset and the resulting jurisdictional and cost recovery implications. 
 Part III defends the proposition that not all uncertainty is created 
equal. For instance, some uncertainty is the result of coordination 
problems involving multiple actors, some uncertainty is the result of 
a single actor, some uncertainty surrounds whether an activity will 
be regulated at all, and some uncertainty surrounds how an activity 
will be regulated. It explores situations where uncertainty is 
particularly troublesome and those situations where the law has 
embraced uncertainty. It creates a new framework for evaluating and 
characterizing these different varieties of uncertainty along a 
spectrum, depending on three critical features: (1) the context, (2) the 
scope, and (3) the source of the uncertainty. Whereas high levels of 
uncertainty may justify avoiding the uncertainty, low levels of 
uncertainty associated with an activity are more deserving of efforts 
to resolve the uncertainty. 
 Applying this framework to the uncertainty facing energy storage 
reveals a level of uncertainty that can be managed in a way to avoid 
stifling the development of this important technology. When the 
critical features of energy storage uncertainty are analyzed, it 
becomes clear that this uncertainty is consistent with the general 
uncertainty that surrounds the energy industry, the scope is 
narrower than other types of uncertainty, and the source of the 
 26. See infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text. 
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uncertainty is one federal agency intentionally seeking to reap the 
advantages of energy storage in a world where the law is struggling 
to keep up with the technology. 
 Given its place on the uncertainty spectrum, Part IV proposes 
strategies for stakeholders and regulators to continue to function 
within this zone of uncertainty. This is particularly important for an 
emerging technology that is required to compete against entrenched 
incumbent fossil fuel generators.27 It explains how regulated entities 
can harness the benefits of federalism by encouraging state 
initiatives, developing precedent through FERC orders, and 
continuing to acquire important information necessary for eventual 
resolution of the uncertainty. Part IV describes how regulators can 
help narrow the range of uncertainty as well. Public utility 
commissions can craft creative cost recovery mechanisms, and FERC 
can develop a framework for its decisionmaking process that will 
guide and provide consistency for future case-by-case determinations. 
These efforts can establish gradual norms that narrow the range of 
uncertainty so that it does not paralyze the deployment of energy 
storage technologies.  
 The hope is that, similar to other emerging technologies, “the 
relative novelty of these [new emerging] technologies . . . suggests 
that the interests on different sides of each issue are less likely to 
have ossified into permanent resistance to compromise,” allowing 
more room for both the regulator and the regulated to work together 
to resolve uncertainty.28 Such strategies can have implications for 
emerging technologies operating in the shadow of uncertainty that 
extend far beyond energy storage. 
II.   ENERGY STORAGE AND ITS REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY  
 Most individuals are surprised to learn about the extent of energy 
storage projects that are already functioning on a commercial level. 
They may be even more surprised to learn that the federal 
government has identified over seventeen different applications of 
energy storage for the electricity grid.29 This Part begins by providing 
 27. Jon Wellinghoff, the chairman of FERC from 2009–2013, said in an interview in 
2013 that solar will “overtake everything,” and said that once storage is brought into the 
equation it is pretty much “game over” for traditional forms of generation. Herman K. 
Trabish, FERC Chair Jon Wellinghoff: Solar ‘Is Going to Overtake Everything’, 
GREENTECHMEDIA (Aug. 21, 2013),http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ferc-chair-
wellinghoff-sees-a-solar-future-and-a-utility-of-the-future.  
 28. David A. Strifling, Environmental Federalism and Effective Regulation of 
Nanotechnology, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1131, 1159 (2010). 
 29. JIM EYER & GARTH COREY, SANDIA NAT’L LABS., ENERGY STORAGE FOR THE 
ELECTRICITY GRID: BENEFITS AND MARKET POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT GUIDE 21 tbl.3 (2010).  
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an introduction to various types of energy storage technologies.         
It then explains the various benefits of energy storage for our 
electrical grid. It concludes by analyzing the primary uncertainty 
facing energy storage: how to classify energy storage assets according 
to the existing taxonomy that was designed for more traditional 
energy sources.  
A.   Energy Storage Technologies 
 Bulk energy storage consists of a suite of technologies used to hold 
the energy from previously generated electricity at times of low 
demand until demand is high or transmission lines are freed up to 
transmit the electricity.30 Bulk energy storage in the United States is 
dominated by pumped-storage hydropower (PSH), a century-old 
technology that uses cheaper off-peak electricity to pump water from 
a lower to an upper reservoir and then releases the water to turn 
turbines to generate electricity during on-peak hours.31 Although it 
has the capacity to provide price advantages, PSH has generated its 
share of controversy over the years, with critics pointing to energy 
inefficiencies and adverse environmental impacts of damming 
water.32 There are approximately twenty-two gigawatts (GW) of PSH 
deployed in the United States across forty sites, much of which was 
built between 1970 and 1990.33 Pumped storage developers have 
 30. “Bulk” storage or “grid-scale” storage is to be distinguished from “distributed” 
energy storage, which involves a smaller, customer-specific application. Included in this 
form of energy storage are electric vehicle batteries and on-site generators. Compare 
InterContinental Hotels Group, DOE GLOBAL ENERGY STORAGE DATABASE, SANDIA NAT’L 
LABS., http://www.energystorageexchange.org/projects/356 (last visited June 14, 2014) 
(detailing distributed energy storage projects at two San Francisco hotels that utilize 
Lithium ion batteries to avoid high demand charges), with KCP&L SmartGrid Innovation 
Park, DOE GLOBAL ENERGY STORAGE DATABASE, SANDIA NAT’L LABS., 
http://www.energystorageexchange.org/projects/1297 (last visited June 14, 2014) (deploying 
similar battery storage technology to support grid-scale energy delivery at peak demand 
times of day in Kansas City). Tesla’s plans for a new $5 billion “gigafactory” has a projected 
output of 35 GW per year, which would exceed the worldwide production of lithium ion 
batteries in 2013. Thomas Overton, The Year Energy Storage Hit Its Stride, POWER MAG. 
(May 1, 2014), http://www.powermag.com/the-year-energy-storage-hit-its-stride. 
 31. Chi-Jen Yang & Robert B. Jackson, Opportunities and Barriers to Pumped-Hydro 
Energy Storage in the United States, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 839, 
839-40 (2011). 
 32. E.g., Eric Wesoff, Update: California Energy Storage Bill AB 2514 Signed Into 
Law by Governor, GREENTECHMEDIA (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/ 
articles/read/vc-cmeas-gunderson-on-utility-scale-storage (“In California, ‘we’re taking 
down dams not putting them up.’ ”). 
 33. Pumped Storage, supra note 15 (“There are 40 pumped storage sites operating in 
the United States . . . totaling more than 22 gigawatts (GW) of storage capacity, roughly 
2% of U.S. generating capacity.”); see also DEHOLM ET AL., supra note 15, at 7-8 & n.14 (“To 
place these values in perspective, between 1993 and 2008, more than 320 GW of 
conventional capacity was constructed in the United States. With the exception of the 
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refined the technology to increase efficiency,34 and the international 
interest in PSH is growing.35 Nevertheless, this form of storage is 
geographically constrained. 
 The next generation of grid-scale energy storage includes 
compressed air energy storage (CAES), a technology that uses off-
peak energy to drive compressors that inject air into an underground 
storage cavern.36 The air heats as it is compressed, and this heat 
energy is later released to turn turbines and generate electricity back 
onto the grid during on-peak hours. Only one large CAES 110 
megawatt (MW) commercial facility has been constructed in the 
United States in McIntosh, Alabama, but it is leading the way for 
future projects.37 CAES projects are planning to move forward in both 
Ohio38 and Texas,39 and Nebraska40 may not be far behind. Recent 
completion of previously started PHS facilities and a few demonstration projects, no 
significant storage capacity was added.”). 
 34. NAT’L HYDROPOWER ASS’N’S PUMPED STORAGE DEV. COUNCIL, CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT 2-3 (2012), available at 
http://www.hydro.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/NHA_PumpedStorage_071212b12.pdf 
[hereinafter CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES]. 
 35. “Since 1990, global hydropower generation has increased by 50%.” INT’L ENERGY 
AGENCY, RENEWABLE ENERGY ESSENTIALS: HYDROPOWER 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Hydropower_Essentials.pdf. 
 36. CH2MHILL, PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION GREENHOUSE GAS 
PERMIT APPLICATION, at i (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/region6/6pd/air/pd-
r/ghg/apex-matagorda-app.pdf. 
 37. The first CAES plant, a 290 megawatt facility, was built in Huntorf, Germany in 
1978. Thirteen years later, the 110 megawatt McIntosh CAES plant began operations in 
Alabama. The plants have a combined 50-year-plus lifetime. Id. at 5-11. 
 38. In Ohio, Norton Energy is proposing to use a limestone mine to store compressed 
air. In November 2009, Akron utility FirstEnergy bought the rights and plans to revive the 
development, which would be in an abandoned limestone mine in Norton, Ohio. 
Haddington Sells Rights to its Norton Energy Storage Project to FirstEnergy, PR NEWSWIRE 
(Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.prnewswire.com/new-releases/haddingtong-sells-rights-to-its-
norton-energy-storage-project-to-firstenergy-71572382.html. 
 39. In Texas, Apex has recently received approval for a 350 million-dollar-plus Bethel 
Energy Center, slated to be a 319 MW facility. Scheduled to open in 2016, Bethel Energy 
Center will be the first CAES to use wind power to condense the air. Paul Stone, Anderson 
County Getting Energy Center, PALESTINE HERALD-PRESS (July 11, 2012), 
http://palestineherald.com/local/x941521205/Anderson-County-getting-energy-center; see 
also Apex Bethel Energy Center, APEX CAES, http://www.apexcaes.com/project (last visited 
June 14, 2014). In 2012, General Compression commissioned a two megawatts CAES 
facility to integrate a windfarm in Texas. Texas Dispatchable Wind 1, LLC, 
GENERALCOMPRESSION, http://www.generalcompression.com/index.php/tdw1 (last visited 
June 14, 2014). 
 40. In late 2011, the Nebraska Public Power District announced that it planned to buy 
the rights to store compressed air in sandstone formations in the western part of that state. 
Dan Haugen, Scrapped Iowa Project Leaves Energy Storage Lessons, MIDWEST ENERGY 
NEWS, (Jan. 19, 2012) http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2012/01/19/scrapped-iowa-
project-leaves-energy-storage-lessons/. However, Iowa Stored Energy Park, a cooperative in 
Iowa funded in part by the Department of Energy, was abandoned after data revealed that 
the geology would not properly support a compressed air storage facility. Id.  
                                                                                                                                        
2014]  RECONSIDERING REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY 707 
 
demonstration projects are even trying to break CAES free from its 
geological shackles by storing air in existing pipelines41 and steel air 
storage tanks42 instead of underground, an advance that would 
render CAES much more mobile.  
 Other storage generally takes three additional forms: (1) electro-
chemical (batteries), (2) mechanical (flywheels), and (3) thermal 
energy. Batteries can take many forms (Li-ion, NaS, NiCd, Metal Air, 
lead acid, liquid, etc.), each with their own strengths and weaknesses 
depending on whether they are evaluated based on energy, power, or 
dischargeability.43 But many other types are racing to the commercial 
finish line. The primary limitations associated with batteries, 
however, are the costs and the size of the battery required to store a 
meaningful amount of electricity.44 One of the world’s largest battery 
storage facilities is operating in Fairbanks, Alaska. The Alaskan 
battery is larger than a football field, yet can only provide enough 
electricity for 12,000 residents for seven minutes.45  
 Efforts to develop smaller, more effective batteries are slowly 
taking hold. Duke Energy has installed a thirty-six MW advanced-
lead acid battery at the Notrees Wind Farm in Texas, connecting to 
Texas’ grid operator, Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).46 
AES Energy Storage owns and operates an eight MW lithium-ion 
battery plant in Johnson City that provides rapid frequency 
regulation services to New York’s grid operator, New York 
Independent Service Operator (NYISO)47 and the world’s largest 
 41. E.g., SustainX Begins Startup of World’s First Grid-Scale Isothermal Compressed 
Air Energy Storage System, SUSTAINX (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.sustainx.com/e9c13ca1-
134c-49e9-9031-036592c1b37a/about-us-news-events-detail.htm. 
 42. E.g., Technology, LIGHTSAIL ENERGY, http://www.lightsail.com (last visited June 
14, 2014). 
 43. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GRID ENERGY STORAGE 17-20 (2013), available at 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/12/f5/Grid%20Energy%20Storage%20December%202
013.pdf; see also ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., ELECTRICITY ENERGY STORAGE 
TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS (2010). 
 44. ABBAS A. AKHIL ET AL., SANDIA NAT’L LABS., DOE/EPRI 2013 ELECTRICITY 
STORAGE HANDBOOK IN COLLABORATION WITH NRECA app. E at 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2013-5131.pdf. 
 45. See, e.g., Jon R. Luoma, The Challenge for Green Energy: How to Store Excess 
Electricity, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (July 13, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/ 
the_challenge_for_green_energy_how_to_store_excess_electricity/2170/. 
 46. Tina Casey, North America’s Largest Wind Energy Storage Facility Fires Up in 
Texas, CLEAN TECHNICA (Jan. 24, 2013) http://cleantechnica.com/2013/01/24/largest-wind-
energy-storage-facility-in-u-s-fires-up-in-texas/; Duke Energy to Deploy Energy Storage 
Technology at Texas Wind Farm, DUKE ENERGY (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.duke-
energy.com/news/releases/2011041402.asp. 
 47. Eric Bloom, Energy Storage on the Grid in the New Year, NAVIGANT RESEARCH 
BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011), http://navigantresearch.com/blog/articles/energy-storage-on-the-grid-
in-the-new-year. 
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lithium-ion battery farm (thirty-two MW) in West Virginia.48 Primus 
Power is on track to deliver EnergyPodsTM to California’s Modesto 
Irrigation District starting in 2014.49 Xtreme Power deployed about 
seventy-eight MW of energy storage projects by the time this Article 
went to print, including several in Hawaii.50 The financial press has 
ever-increasing numbers of press releases, with different institutions 
touting their respective breakthroughs on battery energy storage.51 
Similar discussions surround fuel cells, a technology that functions 
like batteries through electrochemical processes.52 Battery storage is 
expanding on an international level as well, with Japan, India, and 
China coupling storage with telecommunications towers.53 
 Flywheels reflect yet another form of energy storage. Flywheels 
accelerate a rotor to a very high speed and maintain the energy in 
the system as rotational energy—energy that is available instantly 
when needed by slowing down the flywheel.54 New York is home to 
the first flywheel storage plant. With help from the New York State 
Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), Beacon 
Power has developed a twenty MW flywheel energy storage plan in 
Stephentown, New York.55 Although it has been successful in 
 48. Ucilia Wong, The World’s Largest Lithium-Ion Battery Farm Comes Online, 
FORBES (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2011/10/27/worlds-largest-
lithium-ion-battery-farm/. 
 49. See DEP’T OF ENERGY, PRIMUS POWER CORP., WIND FIRMING ENERGYFARM (Aug. 
2013), https://www.smartgrid.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/project_desc/OE0000228_Fact%25 
20Sheet_Primus%2520Jul2013_3.0%5B1%5D.pdf; Tom Stepien, Primus Power, Wind 
Firming EnergyFarm (Sept. 25, 2012) (PowerPoint presentation), available at 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ESS%202012%20Peer%20Review%20-%20Wind%20Firming 
%20EnergyFarm%20-%20Tom%20Stepien%2C%20Primus%20Power.pdf.  
 50. See Proven & Flexible Storage Solutions: Experience, XTREME POWER, 
http://www.xtremepower.com/advantage/experience (last visited June 14, 2014). 
 51. See, e.g., Luoma, supra note 45 (“Early this year, IBM revealed that it was 
launching a major research program into what looks like an even more promising 
technology—the lithium metal-air battery. Last month, a company called PolyPlus 
announced that it had already succeeded in developing one.”); Kevin Bullis, TR10: Liquid 
Battery, MIT TECHNOLOGY REV. (Mar./Apr. 2009). http://www2.technologyreview.com/ 
article/412190/tr10-liquid-battery/ (MIT suggesting that liquid batteries are going to make 
it to commercialization first). Bill Gates invested in Aquion, a new environmentally sound 
battery made with saltwater instead of lithium that can create environmental disposal 
problems. Andrew Herndon, Bill Gates Invests in Battery Maker Aquion Energy, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-02/bill-gates-invests-
in-battery-maker-aquion-energy.html. 
 52. Haugen, supra note 40 (proposing a technology that would convert excess wind 
energy at night to hydrogen used in a fuel cell). 
 53. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 43, at 13-14.  
 54. Technology, BEACON POWER, http://beaconpower.com/?page_id=103 (last visited 
June 14, 2014). 
 55. Bradford P. Roberts, Energy Storage Solutions, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, May 
2012, at 46, 49-50, available at http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2012/05/energy-
storage-solutions; Matt Lazarewicz & Judith Judson, Performance of First 20 MW 
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providing frequency regulation to New York’s grid and “[i]ts 
performance has influenced both regulatory and legislative 
initiatives,”56 Beacon Power recently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
and needed to be restructured to continue development.57  
 A last form of energy storage, generally not used for bulk system 
storage, is thermal energy storage. A common thermal energy storage 
system “chills a storage medium [usually water, ice, or a phase-
change material] during periods of low cooling demand and then uses 
the stored cooling later to meet air‐ conditioning load or process 
cooling loads.”58 California, for instance, recently began installing 
fifty-three MW in distributed ice storage across rooftops.59 Although 
it is unclear which form of “new generation” energy storage will 
ultimately prevail for widespread commercialization, it is becoming 
clear that some form of energy storage is on the horizon.  
B.   Value of Energy Storage 
 Energy storage has varied benefits, depending on its type and 
purpose.60 Many types of energy storage are able to provide multiple 
services, and therefore yield multiple benefits.61 A productive 
economy requires significant amounts of electricity, and demand is 
Commercial Flywheel Frequency Regulation Plant, BEACONPOWER (June 7, 2011), 
http://www.beaconpower.com/files/Beacon_Power_presentation_ESA%206_7_11_FINAL.pdf. 
 56. Roberts, supra note 55, at 50. 
 57. Jeff Postelwait, Beacon Power Emerges From Bankruptcy With New Energy 
Storage Project, ELEC. LIGHT & POWER (June 24, 2013), http://www.elp.com/articles/ 
2013/06/beacon-power-emerges-from-bankruptcy-with-new-energy-storage-project.html 
(noting the company was acquired by Rockland Capital, which assumed 25 million dollars 
of its outstanding DOE-guaranteed load plus provided additional cash and equity to 
finance a second flywheel plant). 
 58. PUB. INT. ENERGY RESEARCH PROGRAM, 2020 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF ENERGY IN 
CALIFORNIA 58 (2011), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011publications/CEC-500-
2011-047/CEC-500-2011-047.pdf. 
 59. Ice Energy Project, S. CAL. PUB. POWER AUTH., http://www.scppa.org/ 
pages/projects/ice_energy.html (last visited June 14, 2014).  
 60. ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., 2012 STORAGE REPORT: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 13 (2012) (These benefits can 
be felt in different degrees by various actors in the energy regime. The ISO/RTO 
transmission operators can benefit from energy storage through a number of mechanisms: 
ancillary services, real time energy balancing, energy price arbitrage, and resource 
adequacy. Generators can use it for intermittent resource integration for wind and solar, 
and supply firming. Transmission/Distribution can use it for peak shaving, to defer 
upgrade, provide relief from congestions, and transmission operation. End users/customers 
can use it for outage mitigation in microgrids, time of use energy management, power 
quality, and back-up power.). 
 61. One of the main benefits of energy storage is its ability to provide multiple 
services, including load leveling (and associated benefits such as a reduction in cycling-
induced maintenance) along with regulation and contingency reserves and firm capacity. 
DENHOLM ET AL., supra note 15; see Strifling, supra note 28. 
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only projected to increase in the future.62 Nearly every modern 
convenience—like computers, cell phones, machinery, and lights—is 
at the mercy of adequate electricity flows. The energy demand (or 
load) becomes even greater in the summertime, when air 
conditioning units in at least half of the country are running full-
time. Although the market and regulators are still coming to grips 
with how to properly quantify these values without double-counting, 
investors should take confidence in the government’s recognition of 
the four primary categories of energy storage benefits involving 
resource adequacy planning, adapting to changing public policy 
goals, and continuing to provide safe and cost-effective electricity:    
(1) reliability, (2) lower costs, (3) efficient production, and (4) 
environmental benefits.63  
1.   Reliability  
 A first benefit of energy storage is its ability to enhance the 
reliability of the grid. These reliability benefits can come in the form 
of backup electricity in times of power outages, enhanced power 
quality to prevent outages, and frequency regulation that adjusts for 
differences between grid operators’ predictions and actual demand. 
 Backup Electricity. The concept of backup electricity is far from 
novel. Hospitals and other emergency service providers have been 
relying on back-up generators for many years.64 Santa Rita jail in 
California, one of the largest inmate facilities, has taken steps          
to insulate itself from the risk of power outages by being one of the 
first microgrids capable of isolating itself from the traditional grid, in 
 62. The Energy Information Administration estimates a twenty-nine percent increase 
in electricity demand by 2040 (to 4954 billion kilowatthours). U.S. ENERGY INFO ADMIN, 
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 MT-16 (2014), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf. 
 63. “In its 2009 Smart Grid Policy proposed policy statement, the FERC justified 
giving energy storage a high priority in smart grid standards development and cost 
recovery, based in large part on the benefits energy storage affords in integrating what the 
FERC termed ‘unprecedented’ amounts of variable generation resources. It pointed to the 
ability of energy storage to address three issues it saw attending large amounts of variable 
generation on the grid: resource adequacy concerns (the loss of variable generation during 
peak periods or critical times), resource management (the potential for over-generation 
during off-peak, low-load periods), and system stability concerns (that occur when there is 
high penetration of variable resources with low inertia properties). The FERC also noted 
the potential for energy storage to optimize bulk power production and facilitate power 
system balancing, among other benefits.” Margaret Caffey et al., Report of the Renewable 
Energy Committee, 32 ENERGY L.J. 405, 427-29 (2011) (citing Smart Grid Policy, 126 FERC 
¶ 61,253, ¶¶ 18-20 (Mar. 19, 2009)); see also ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 60. 
 64. Will Gruver, Diesel Power Generators for Hospitals and Prisons, US POWER & 
ENV’T (2007), http://www.uspowerco.com/articles/diesel_power_generators_for_hospitals_ 
and_pri. 
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part based on the energy storage onsite.65 This type of distributed 
storage also is particularly useful in times of power outages due       
to weather-related disruptions, which are often sporadic and      
short-lived. For instance, Hurricane Sandy provided a platform for a 
few energy storage facilities operating in New York to demonstrate 
their success.66 
 Power Quality. Energy storage also can assist in a general class of 
services referred to as power quality and system stability. The 
National Renewable Energy Laboratories describes it well: 
Power quality refers to voltage spikes, sags, momentary outages, 
and harmonics. Storage devices are often used at customer load 
sites to buffer sensitive equipment against power quality issues. 
Electric power systems also can experience oscillations of 
frequency and voltage. Unless damped, these disturbances can 
limit the ability of utilities to transmit power and affect the 
stability and reliability of the entire system. System stability 
requires response times of less than a second, and can be met by a 
variety of devices including fast-responding energy storage.67 
 Frequency Regulation. Grid operator projections of supply and 
demand do not always mirror reality. In fact, most days require some 
last-minute injections or withdrawals to correct for the gaps between 
supply and demand. “Frequency regulation service is the injection or 
withdrawal of real power by facilities capable of responding 
appropriately to a transmission system’s frequency deviations or 
interchange power imbalance . . . .”68  
 Maintaining the frequency of the transmission system within an 
acceptable range is critical to reliable operations. When generation 
dispatch does not equal actual load and losses on a moment-by-
moment basis, the imbalance will result in the grid’s frequency 
deviating from the standard (sixty Hertz). Minor frequency 
deviations affect energy consuming devices; major deviations cause 
generation and transmission equipment to separate from the grid, in 
the worst case leading to a cascading blackout.  
 65. Melissa C. Lott, California Jail Transformed into Modern Microgrid, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (June 19, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/2012/06/19/   
california-jail-transforms-into-modern-microgrid/. 
 66. Michael Roach, Hurricane Sandy & the Emperor’s New Clothes: Microgrids as a 
Risk Mitigation Strategy for Extreme Weather Events, MICROGRID HORIZONS 1, 13-14 (Dec. 
13, 2012), http://mseia.net/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Roach_HurricaneSandyandthe 
EmperorsNewClothes_2012_wRefs.doc. 
 67. DENHOLM ET AL., supra note 15, at 13. 
 68. Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, 
Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064, ¶ 4 (Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 755].  
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 “Frequency regulation service can help to prevent these adverse 
consequences by rapidly correcting deviations in the transmission 
system’s frequency to bring it within an acceptable range.”69 
Although fossil fuel generators have traditionally been used to 
regulate or correct frequency deviations, energy storage can join 
other emerging technologies like demand response to help provide 
this service.70 The faster a resource can ramp up or down,71 the more 
accurately it can respond to the correction signal, which places these 
emerging technologies at a distinct technological advantage over 
fossil fuel generators.72 
2.   Lower Costs  
 A second benefit of energy storage is its ability to reduce 
electricity prices. Electricity prices vary depending on its time of use, 
and prices are generally highest during “on-peak” periods, when the 
majority of our population is awake and “plugged in.”73 Where energy 
storage can reduce the amount of peak electricity needed, costs are 
projected to decrease.74 Although these on-peak periods represent 
only a small proportion of the total time electricity is needed, 
resource planners cannot base their decisions on the average load. 
Instead, energy resources are developed based on the peak loads. 
Generation, transmission, and distribution systems also must be 
sized for peak demand; as demand grows, new systems (both lines 
and substations) must be installed, often only to meet the peak 
demand for a few hours per year. Without wide scale energy storage, 
these peak demands are addressed primarily through peaker power 
 69. See id. at 67,261. 
 70. Id. (“Provision by other resources is emerging, as technologies develop and tariff 
and market rules [are appropriately] adapt[ed] to accommodate new resources. For 
example, the Texas Interconnection and MISO currently use controllable demand response 
in addition to generators to provide frequency regulation service.”). 
 71. “ ‘Ramping’ or the ability to ‘ramp’ is traditionally defined as the ability to change 
the output of real power from a generating unit per some unit of time, usually measured as 
megawatts per minute (MW/minute). A generator ramps up to produce more energy and 
ramps down to produce less. A storage device ramps up by discharging energy and ramps 
down by charging.” Id. at 67,260 n.3. 
 72. Id. at 67,265. But see discussion infra Part III.2.b. FERC has noted that current 
compensation for frequency regulation services is inadequate to accommodate these new 
resources like energy storage. Under the current compensation rules, slow-ramping and 
fast-ramping resources are provided the same amount. 
 73. See, e.g., On-Peak & Off-Peak Hours, PACIFIC POWER, http://www.pacificpower.net/ 
ya/po/otou/ooh.html (last visited June 14, 2014). 
 74. Judith Judson McQueeney, Chair of the ESA Advocacy Council, Statement of the 
Electricity Storage Association before the Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n 2 (Sept. 11, 
2013), available at http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20130911144647-Judson%20      
Comments.pdf. 
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plants. Peaker plants are those generators that are able to ramp up 
and down rapidly to respond to a need from the grid operator. 
Furthermore, peaker plants also bring with them significant capital 
cost requirements, additional emissions, and usually a need to 
construct additional transmission lines to connect to the existing 
grid. Instead of building additional generation to satisfy peak loads, 
energy can be generated and stored during off-peak periods and 
discharged during peak periods to satisfy increased load.  
 In addition to ensuring adequate on-peak resources and reducing 
or eliminating the need for peaking facilities, this type of action also 
could reduce the need to construct additional transmission and 
distribution lines.75 New lines may be difficult or expensive to build, 
often involving high capital costs and generating significant siting 
controversy. These expenses and controversies can be avoided or 
deferred by deploying energy storage located near the load.76 
Bringing the energy storage closer to the source also may alleviate 
the high line-loss rates that occur during peak demand.77 Energy 
storage may be able to reduce or eliminate some of these costs, 
reducing rates for consumers. “Storage improves system efficiency 
and return on investment (ROI) by shifting peak load to off-peak 
hours and potentially reducing new investment in transmission 
infrastructure – if the storage is properly located with respect to 
transmission system constraints.”78  
3.   Efficiency 
 A third benefit of energy storage lies in its ability to address 
potential over-generation during off-peak periods. Under the current 
constraints requiring instantaneous electricity use, significant 
amounts of electricity are wasted. This waste occurs for a number of 
reasons, including the generation of electricity during off-peak hours 
without demand to satisfy the supply and constraints along 
transmission lines. Renewable resources like wind, for instance, are 
 75. Michael Kanellos, Is Energy Storage a Product or Service, GREENTECH MEDIA 
(Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/is-energy-storage-a-product-
or-service (“A 1.2-megawatt sodium sulfur storage facility in West Virginia commissioned 
in 2006 trimmed peak power in the region by 10% to 15% and postponed the need to erect 
another plant . . . .”). 
 76. ALI NOURAI, SANDIA NAT’L LABS., INSTALLATION OF THE FIRST DISTRIBUTED 
ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM (DESS) AT AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER (AEP): A STUDY FOR THE 
DOE ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS PROGRAM 13-14 (2007), available at 
http://infoserve.sandia.gov/ sand_doc/2007/073580.pdf. 
 77. DENHOLM ET AL., supra note 15, at 12 (citing Ali Nourai et al., Load Leveling 
Reduces T&D Line Losses, 23 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY 2168 (2008)).  
 78. DAN RASTLER, ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., MISO ENERGY STORAGE STUDY 
PHASE I REPORT 3-1 (2011) [hereinafter MISO ENERGY STORAGE REPORT]. 
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generally strongest during winter, off-peak hours. This disconnect 
between supply and demand can result in excess electricity that 
could be captured through energy storage. 
 For example, the Bonneville Power Association (BPA) has been 
faced with “too much of a good thing” with ample wind resources and 
water flows for hydropower. Its transmission lines can only transmit 
so much electricity, and this has forced the agency to choose between 
providing wind or hydropower to the grid. Were BPA to allow the 
excess water to spill over the dams, it would send hyper-oxygenated 
water into the Columbia River’s vital salmon runs, subjecting it to 
potential Clean Water Act violations.79 Consequently, BPA agreed to 
supply the power obligations of their thermal generators without 
charge, a plan that was not as appealing to wind generators, who 
were not concerned with saving fuel costs and were instead 
concerned with generating wind to obtain the useful production tax 
credits (PTCs) and Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) associated with 
wind generation.80 The dispute resulted in a FERC order requiring a 
new BPA curtailment protocol in which BPA agreed to compensate 
the wind generators for any PTC and unbundled RECs lost due to 
non-generation.81  
 Energy storage would have alleviated this problem, allowing for 
the electricity generated from both wind and hydropower to 
eventually make it to the grid. Additional energy storage would 
minimize the curtailment of renewable energy during these times of 
generator or transmission constraints, improve the capacity factors of 
generators, and reduce the pressure on minimum load requirements 
for conventional generators.82 Similar efforts to enhance the 
efficiency of existing renewable generators can be seen in places like 
New  Jersey, where the legislature has recently proposed funding cuts 
for renewables at the expense of increased funding for energy storage.83 
 79. See Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 137 FERC ¶ 61,185 
(2011). 
 80. See id. at 4-5. 
 81. See Compliance Filing of the Bonneville Power Admin. at 26-27, Iberdrola 
Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 137 FERC ¶ 61,185 (2011), No. EL11-44-
000. 
 82. Fossil fuel plants indicate a level below which they cannot easily ramp down 
(often fifty percent). Renewable energy is therefore curtailed to prevent disruption of the 
efficiency of the fossil fuel plants. “One of the major conclusions of wind integration studies 
looking at higher penetrations is that minimum load points will need to be lowered 
substantially below their current annual minimums.” DENHOLM ET AL, supra note 15, at 
27-28. 
 83. Jeff Spross, New Jersey Wants to Boost Funding for Energy Storage Technology—
Here are Some Options, CLIMATEPROGRESS (Apr. 17, 2013, 11:00 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/04/17/1879471/new-jersey-wants-to-boost-funding-
for-energy-storage-technology-here-are-some-options/. 
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4.   Environmental 
 A fourth benefit of energy storage is found in the reduced 
environmental impact that is realized by relying on more renewable 
energy to supply our nation’s increasing electricity demand. Fossil 
fuel combustion is the number one contributor of our nation’s 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as a number of other air 
pollutants.84 Renewable energy by itself is not interchangeable with 
the baseload sources of fossil fuel energy like coal. Yet, by pairing 
energy storage with renewable energy, it firms the renewable energy 
generation, and may be able to displace some fossil fuel generators, 
as well as avoid their corresponding GHG and pollution emissions.85 
More precisely, it could displace polluting peaker plants and the 
ancillary services that are traditionally provided by fossil fuel 
generators.86 “[L]arge-scale electricity storage promises [to] be an 
energy game-changer, unshackling alternative energy from the 
constraints of intermittence.”87 
 The use of energy storage to provide energy services as opposed to 
traditional fossil fuel generation will also minimize the market risks 
associated with different primary fuel sources.88 Natural gas looks 
quite attractive at the present time, with vast shale discoveries and 
 84. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra note 11, at ES-6 
(“The primary greenhouse gas emitted by human activities in the United States was CO2, 
representing approximately 83.6 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions. The largest 
source of CO2, and of overall greenhouse gas emissions, was fossil fuel combustion.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Smitherman, No. A-09-CA-917-SS, 2012 WL 
4465607, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012) (noting the PUCT indicated that a wind-
generated power could be made firm by the use of energy storage techniques); Benjamin K. 
Sovacool, Running on Empty: The Electricity-Water Nexus and the U.S. Electric Utility 
Sector, 30 ENERGY L.J. 11, 37 (2009) (“Furthermore, attaching wind turbines to pumped 
hydro and compressed air energy storage systems can improve their capacity factor to 
above seventy percent, making them ‘functionally equivalent to a conventional baseload . . . 
plant.’ ” (citation omitted)). 
 86. McQueeny, supra note 74, at 3 (“[One] MW of storage has the potential to offset    
2-4 MWs of traditional fossil generation providing frequency regulation.”); Janice Lin & 
Giovanni Damato, How Storage Can Help Get Rid of Peaker Plants, GREENTECH MEDIA 
(June 28, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/energy-storage-vs.-peakers 
(“[A]ssuming Pacific Gas and Electric’s base load electric mix as the off-peak source of 
electricity, energy storage would provide 55% CO2 savings, 85% NOx savings, and up to 
96% savings of CO per MWh of on-peak electricity delivered.”); see also LUONG, supra note 
19, at 18 (“By using low-carbon energy storage, rather than resorting to flexible power 
generators, such as fast-ramping coal and gas plants, electricity-related carbon emissions 
are significantly reduced.”). 
 87. Luoma, supra note 45.  
 88. When “frequency regulation” services are needed, grid operators traditionally turn 
to natural gas generators, capable of ramping up and down rapidly to regulate or correct 
frequency deviations.  Natural gas prices exhibit significantly more price volatility than 
energy storage.  See Low Natural Gas Prices Drive Fuel Shifts in the Electric Power Sector, 
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. fig. 3 (June 15, 2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/2012/06/low-
natural-gas-prices-drive-fuel-shifts-electric-power-sector. 
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low natural gas prices. But an adjustment of our energy economy 
away from coal towards natural gas will result in a less diversified 
supply than presently exists, increasing the risk of supply 
disruptions due to future congestion in natural gas pipelines or     
price increases. 
C.   Regulatory Uncertainty Surrounding Energy Storage 
 Despite these substantial benefits, energy storage still comprises a 
mere two percent of the energy generated in the United States.89 As 
discussed above, although technical and financial uncertainty surely 
play a role, stakeholders repeatedly point to regulatory uncertainty 
as one of the primary barriers to energy storage’s further 
deployment.90 This section analyzes the primary regulatory 
uncertainty surrounding energy storage: FERC’s approach to energy 
storage classification and the resulting inability of stakeholders to 
predict the future state of the regulatory environment. 
 These classifications are important, because much of energy law is 
premised on the labels provided to various energy transactions and 
assets. The two primary regulatory uncertainties associated with 
energy storage are (1) ambiguities about how to label the purchase 
and sale of electricity coming in and out of an energy storage device, 
resulting in jurisdictional uncertainty, and (2) ambiguities about how 
to label the energy storage assets, resulting in cost recovery 
uncertainty. The answers to these questions have substantial 
jurisdictional and cost recovery implications for developers, as is 
described below.  
1.   Jurisdictional Uncertainty 
 A first type of uncertainty is whether sales of power into and out 
of an energy storage facility constitute wholesale or retail power.    
The Federal Power Act (FPA) provides FERC with jurisdiction       
over wholesale transactions but reserves the authority over          
retail transactions to the states. Wholesale transactions are sales for 
resale and would fall to FERC and competitive markets. Retail 
transactions are sales to an end user and would fall to the states, 
which use a mixture of regulated cost-of-service formulas and 
restructured markets.91  
 89. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 43, at 4 (“[T]he U.S. has about 24.6 GW 
(approx. 2.3% of total electric production capacity) of grid storage, 95% of which is pumped 
storage hydro.”). 
 90. See supra note 16. 
 91. What Is a Wholesale Electricity Market?, ELEC. POWER SUPPLY ASS’N, 
http://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=wholesaleMarket (last visited June 14, 2014).  
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 FERC has consistently held that electricity coming in and out of 
pumped storage hydropower facilities constitutes a wholesale 
transaction that falls under FERC jurisdiction.92 Similarly, the Texas 
Public Utility Commission (PUC) has been involved in a complicated 
jurisdictional question about whether the purchase and sale of 
electricity coming in and out of an energy storage facility should be 
treated as wholesale or retail transactions. Although Texas law 
would have treated the electricity charged and discharged from an 
energy storage facility as a retail sale, the Texas PUC made a special 
amendment to their rules that allowed a large-scale battery storage 
facility to pay wholesale rates when using electricity off the grid.93  
 It is likely that there is not one answer to this uncertainty, given 
that the answer depends where the facility is located and who is 
managing it. For instance, the answer would differ depending on 
whether it is a merchant generator or an Exempt Wholesale 
Generator (EWG) selling into wholesale markets (wholesale 
transactions), or whether the energy storage facility is located with a 
utility for self-supply or supply directly to consumers (retail 
transactions).94 As a result, energy storage might support both retail 
and wholesale markets, meaning it could be subject to both state and 
federal regulators. Characterization of energy storage as generation 
or transmission can even impact the ability to realize tax credits, as 
was demonstrated by a recent private IRS ruling that allows a wind 
farm to claim a thirty percent investment tax credit on energy 
 92. FERC has previously rejected classifying energy storage as “station power,” 
resulting in a wholesale classification subject to FERC jurisdiction. Station power is used 
for operating the electric equipment on the site of a generation facility or associated 
buildings, and a station power designation renders the electricity used for that purpose a 
retail transaction since the generating facility is then the end user. PJM Interconnection, 
L.L.C., 132 FERC ¶ 61,203, slip op. at 2-3 (Sept. 3, 2010). FERC found that “[l]ike pumping 
energy and compression energy, the energy used to charge Energy Storage Resources will 
be stored for later delivery and not used for operating the electric equipment on the site of 
a generation facility or associated buildings as Station Power is used.” Id. at 4. 
 93. Project Number 39917, DOE GLOBAL ENERGY STORAGE DATABASE, SANDIA NAT’L 
LABS., http://www.energystorageexchange.org/policies/16 (last visited June 14, 2014) (“The 
Commission recognized that a distinction of wholesale electrical load for storage devices 
was reasonable where a storage device . . . takes power from the grid, converts it to 
potential energy, and at a more opportune time transforms this potential energy back into 
electric energy, which is returned to the grid . . . . Storage devices thus differ 
fundamentally from other loads because the power taken from the grid is not 
consumed . . . . In this respect, there is a clear distinction between storage assets and other 
types of load when taking energy from the grid.”); see also Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Order 
Adopting Amendments to § 25.192 and § 25.501 as Approved at the March 7, 2012 Open 
Meeting (Mar. 29, 2012), available at http://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/ 
projects/rules/39917/39917adt.pdf. 
 94. See, e.g., Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, supra note 93, at 2-12 (debating classification of 
electricity sales as wholesale or retail depending upon the location and operator of the 
energy storage facility).  
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storage batteries in part because the device was not treated as 
transmission equipment for regulatory purposes.95 
2.   Cost Recovery Uncertainty 
 A second type of uncertainty surrounds the difficulties of 
classifying energy storage assets into a legal regime premised on 
three traditional categories of assets: (1) generation, (2) transmission, 
and (3) distribution. Traditional energy resources fit relatively neatly 
into only one of these three categories, but energy storage is a 
particularly sticky problem because of its ability to perform more 
than one of these traditional energy functions.96 In fact, it can 
perform all three.97 This causes regulators and developers 
uncertainty about how the costs will be recovered, whether all of the 
value streams associated with energy storage will be able to be 
realized, and how to prevent double-counting associated with the cost 
recovery for energy storage. The most notable source of contention is 
whether energy storage constitutes a generation or a transmission 
asset. This section is not intended to argue for one or the other.98 
Instead, it analyzes the multi-functional nature of energy storage 
technologies and provides a flavor for the resulting cost recovery 
implications for these two classifications.  
(a)   Energy Storage as Generation 
 In one sense, energy storage is a generator of electricity. 
Generation of electricity is defined as “[t]he process of producing 
electric energy by transforming other forms of energy.”99 Most energy 
 95. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, Is the US Independent Generator Model Dead?, 
PROJECT FIN. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 2011, at 1, 1 (discussing IRS Private Letter Ruling 
201142005), available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/publication/d97f5fc1-1924-4ea6-
90cd-48e96a8307f5/presentation/publicationattachment/6d7a694c-94c9-4e23-ae3a-4b411d00f 
682/PFNewsWire_Nov11.pdf. 
 96. It is not the first time that the same facility could fall under two different 
jurisdictions, depending on its function. Report of the Judicial Review Committee, 22 
ENERGY L.J. 195, 206-07 (2001) (“The court affirmed the FERC’s two-pronged analysis of 
its jurisdiction over local distribution facilities: (1) if the facilities are used to effect a sale 
for resale in interstate commerce (wholesale sale), then the FERC has clear jurisdiction 
over them; and (2) if the facilities are used for unbundled retail sales (retail wheeling), 
then the FERC will use a seven-part functional test to determine whether the facilities are 
transmission facilities (subject to the FERC’s jurisdiction) or local distribution facilities 
(subject to state jurisdiction). The court held that the FERC’s two different statutory 
grants of jurisdiction (sales for resale v. transmission in interstate commerce) justify this 
differing treatment of what otherwise would be identical facilities.” (citing Transmission 
Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2000))). 
 97. Id. at 206-08. 
 98. For analyses of the competing classifications, see LUONG, supra note 19. 
 99. Glossary, U.S., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/ 
glossary.html#gh (last visited June 14, 2014). 
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storage technologies are not actually storing electricity, but are 
storing the kinetic, potential, mechanical, or thermal energy and 
converting that energy back to electricity at a specified time. 
Technically, this process may be viewed as “generating” electricity.  
The bulk storage of electricity, for example, if used by a utility to 
time-shift the generation of electricity from a time of low-cost 
generation, such as in the middle of the night, to a time of high-
cost generation, such as during peak use, would be seen as similar 
to generation.100  
This practice would allow for energy arbitrage, where entities can 
generate electricity when prices are low and hold the electricity until 
prices are high.101 
 On the other hand, some argue that an entity may only qualify as 
a generator if it is providing a net increase of electricity into the 
grid.102 In this sense, energy storage facilities are merely converters 
of energy. Energy storage facilities use the energy from previously 
generated electricity to convert it back to electricity at a prescribed 
time. In so doing, they are providing no net increase in electricity 
onto the grid and therefore should not be treated as a generator.103  
 Many different types of energy storage have already earned the 
title of generation from FERC. The large, geographic-specific types of 
energy storage, pumped-storage hydropower and CAES, are treated 
as generation.104 FERC defines a pumped storage hydropower facility 
as that which “stores and generates electricity” and regularly treats 
it as such.105 FERC has even denied a pumped hydro storage 
developer’s request to include their costs in transmission rates, 
pointing out it would be discriminatory to roll the costs into 
transmission rates when other pumped storage hydro owners 
 100. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DRAFT “ENERGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE” – ENERGY 
STORAGE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, at 2-1 (2008), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/ 
files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/EAC_-_Storage_Subcommittee_9-22-08_rev_1.pdf. 
 101. M. KINTNER-MEYER ET AL., PAC. NW. NAT’L LAB., NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
ENERGY STORAGE FOR GRID BALANCING AND ARBITRAGE: PHASE 1, WECC, at 7.1 (2012), 
available at http://energyenvironment.pnnl.gov/pdf/PNNL-21388_National_Assessment_ 
Storage _Phase_1_final.pdf.  
 102. Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, supra note 93, at 5-6.  
 103. In fact, there may even be a net loss of energy, as some forms of energy storage 
are quite inefficient. See, e.g., Pumped Storage Provides Grid Reliability Even with Net 
Loss, supra note 15. 
 104. Pumped Storage Projects, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/ 
industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pump-storage.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2014); 
CAES, POWERSOUTH ENERGY COOPERATIVE, http://www.powersouth.com/mcintosh_ 
power_plant/compressed_air_energy (last visited June 14, 2014). 
 105. Pumped Storage Projects, supra note 104; see also Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C., 
95 FERC ¶ 61,476, at 5-6 (2001). 
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collected revenues as other forms of generation—only by succeeding 
in the wholesale power markets.106  
 Some state regulators have also embraced energy storage as 
generation. New York is treating a proposed CAES facility as a 
“generation facility.”107 The Seneca Compressed Air Energy Storage 
Project would be linked with a 115 kilovolts (kV) transmission 
system, which currently serves generators powered by fossil fuels, 
small hydro, and wind farms.108 CAES is regularly referred to as a 
generator, including in scholarly treatises109 and patents filed with 
the U.S. Patent Office.110 Texas similarly treats CAES as generation 
but has also extended the generation logic to smaller-scale energy 
storage. In 2011, it passed a landmark bill that defines energy 
storage, including batteries and flywheels, as generation when 
offering services on the competitive market employed in that state.111  
 In further support of energy storage as generation, many states 
that have passed renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which require 
utilities to procure a certain amount of their electricity generation 
from renewables, also include energy storage as an eligible 
“source.”112 Many of these RPS only allow energy storage to be used if 
 106. Nevada Hydro Co., 122 FERC ¶ 61,272, at 32-33 (2008). 
 107. See WORLEYPARSONS, NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC AND GAS: SENECA COMPRESSED 
AIR ENERGY STORAGE PROJECT – TRANSMISSION IMPACT STUDY 1 (2011).  
 108. Id.  
 109. Saifur Rahman, Advanced Technology, in ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, 
TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION 3.2 (2012) (“[C]ompressed gas is combusted in the 
turbine to produce electricity . . . and then operate[s] as a generator.”); Laurence D. Kirsch, 
Compensating Electrical Storage Resources, ELEC. J., May 2011, at 72, 73.  
 110. U.S. Patent No. 20110094212 A1, at [0003] (filed Oct. 28, 2009) (“In this scheme, 
the [CAES system] functions as a generator, providing power to a power grid, for 
example.”).  
 111. Tex. Bus. & Com. Bill Analysis, S.B. 943, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011), 
available at  http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/82R/analysis/html/SB00943F.htm. 
 112. ASHLEY JOHNSON, NAT’L HYDROPOWER ASS’N, STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO 
STANDARD REPORT 53 (2011) (noting Pennsylvania allows pumped hydro); CINDY LASH, 
KANSAS LEGISLATOR BRIEFING BOOK 2013: ENERGY AND UTILITIES 1, 2 (2013) (noting 
Kansas allows compressed air energy storage); Beacon Power, Response to the New York 
Energy Highway Request for Information (RFI) 7-8 (May 30, 2012) (noting New York 
classifies energy storage as “alternative energy production,” and is considering adding 
flywheels to its list of energy storage devices eligible for inclusion in the RPS); Montana 
Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_ 
Code=MT11R (last updated July 24, 2013) (noting Montana allows compressed air energy 
storage); Ohio Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE OF STATE 
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY,  http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ 
incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=OH14R (last updated Nov. 8, 2012) (noting Ohio Senate Bill 
221 would categorize storage that improves utilization of renewable resources during off-
peak hours as a “Renewable Energy Resource”); Clean Energy States Alliance (CESA), 
Energy Storage in State RPSs (Dec. 19, 2011) (Webinar presentation), 
http://www.sandia.gov/ess/docs/conferences/Dec_19_RPS_and_Energy_Storage_Combined_
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the electricity input into the storage device originated from a 
renewable source.113 In California, only pumped-storage hydroelectric 
(a traditional renewable source) and “fuel cells using a renewable 
fuel” qualify for the state’s RPS,114 and some local districts, such as 
the Truckee Donner Public Utility District, require that energy 
storage projects be sourced from renewable generators.115 
Massachusetts’s RPS qualifies energy storage facilities only if they 
store “useful thermal energy,” or basically heat energy that would 
have otherwise been wasted in electricity generation, transmission, 
and distribution.116 Utah has proposed allowing compressed air 
energy storage only if the electricity compressing the air was 
produced using a renewable source or with a renewable energy 
credit.117 Hawaii’s limited energy storage integration excludes energy 
from fossil fuel facilities.118 Finally, Michigan’s RPS includes energy 
generated by renewable sources that is kept for later transmission in 
a storage facility.119  
 The label of generator has both jurisdictional and cost recovery 
implications. First, as noted above, the Federal Power Act provides 
states with jurisdiction over “facilities used for the generation of 
electric energy.”120 Being classified as a generator also allows the 
Slides.pdf (noting Delaware allows fuel cells). But cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2 (2013) 
(“ ‘Renewable energy’ shall not include electricity generated from pumped storage, but 
shall include run-of-river generation from a combined pumped-storage and run-of-river 
facility.”).  
 113. This is consistent with FERC’s rejection of energy storage as a “Qualified Facility 
(QF)” under PURPA where there was no demonstration that the amount of power provided 
came from sufficient “renewable resources.” Luz Dev. & Fin. Corp., 51 FERC ¶ 61,078, at 5 
(1990). “[E]nergy storage facilities such as the proposed Luz battery system are a 
renewable resource for purposes of QF certification. However, such facilities are subject to 
the requirement that the energy input to the facility is itself biomass, waste, a renewable 
resource, a geothermal resource, or any combination thereof or a demonstration that any 
fossil fuel-fired input constitutes no more than 25 percent of the total energy input to the 
facility and such uses are consistent with those enumerated in section 3(17)(B) of the FPA.” 
Id. at 9-10. 
 114. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD ELIGIBILITY 8 (4th ed. 
2011).  
 115. TRUCKEE DONNER PUB. UTIL. DIST., RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES 
PROCUREMENT PLAN 5 (2013).  
 116. 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.05(2) (2008).  
 117. S.B. 104, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010).  
 118. HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-91 (2003).  
 119. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.1001 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.1039(c) (2008); 
MUHSIN ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., ENERGY STORAGE AS A TRANSMISSION ASSET 4 (2012), 
available at http://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/advanced-tech-pilots/xtreme-power-
storage-as-transmission.ashx.  
 120. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). However, The Supreme Court has upheld FERC 
authority over generating facilities, so long as the regulated activity can be characterized 
as “the sale of power created by that facility.” Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, 
Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of 
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energy storage facility to have the same status and benefits 
associated with facilitating interconnection with the grid.121 Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, by designating energy storage as 
generation, the provider commits to participation in a complicated 
cost recovery regime.  
 At the wholesale level, FERC continues to foster competition and 
monitor generators and marketers that charge market-based rates to 
ensure that they do not have market power or engage in prohibited 
behavior.122 Wholesale markets exhibit regional differences, with   
two-thirds of the country operated by sophisticated regional markets 
and one-third of the country operated by individual entities. Two-
thirds of the country is operated by seven regional transmission 
operators or independent system operators (RTO-ISOs),123 which 
operate highly organized wholesale markets in which the energy 
resources are bid and dispatched in hourly and daily auctions. 
Although the availability and rules applicable to these markets 
differs by the seven RTO-ISOs,124 an energy storage facility will 
recoup its cost through bidding into one or more of the three relevant 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 615-16 (2004); see also Miss. 
Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1988). Although section 
201(b) of the FPA denies FERC jurisdiction “over facilities used for the generation of 
electric energy,” that provision does not necessarily prevent FERC from including costs 
relating to generating facilities in transmission rates, over which FERC indisputably has 
jurisdiction. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). This is so because this part of section 201(b) is 
modified by the phrase “except as specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter 
III of this chapter.” Id. Given that section 201(a) grants FERC jurisdiction over “the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” and, therefore, over transmission 
rates, Id. § 824(a), FERC may exercise jurisdiction over generation facilities to the extent 
necessary to regulate interstate transmission.’ ” Id. 
 121. See Roberts, supra note 49, at 46, 48-49. 
 122. See 16 U.S.C. § 824s(d) (2012). FERC also established rules that allowed for 
market-based prices to satisfy the “just and reasonable” standard that Congress had 
imposed upon it. Id. 
 123. The seven RTOs are CAISO, ERCOT, SPP, MISO, PJM, NYISO, and ISO-NE. 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Apr. 2, 2014); see also 
The Role of ISOs and RTOs, IRC RTO/ISO COUNCIL, http://www.isorto.org/about/Role (last 
visited June 14, 2014) (RTOs and ISOs serve two-thirds of electricity consumers in the 
United States). 
 124. RTOs may distinguish the availability of various markets based on whether the 
energy storage technology can function in the long-term or the short-term. For instance, 
“MISO currently accommodates long-term storage resources in its markets in the form of 
pumped hydro storage (PHS).” MISO ENERGY STORAGE REPORT, supra note 78, at 1-2. 
“Short-term storage is accommodated as a regulating reserve resource in the MISO 
ancillary services market (ASM).” Id. at v. The Southwest Power Pool operates a market 
design that combines a day-ahead market with unit commitment and a co-optimized 
energy and ancillary services markets. See About The Marketplace, SW. POWER POOL, 
http://www.spp.org/section.asp?pageid=143 (last visited June 14, 2014). 
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markets: (1) energy,125 (2) capacity,126 and (3) ancillary services.127 In 
non-RTO jurisdictions, individual, non-regionalized transmission 
owners “base trades exclusively on bilateral sales negotiated directly 
between suppliers.”128 
 At the retail level, the United States is divided into a mixture of 
traditional cost-of service (regulated) jurisdictions and restructured 
(competitive) jurisdictions.129 In cost-of-service jurisdictions, the 
utilities remain vertically integrated, meaning the utility owns the 
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities servicing the 
area. In these jurisdictions, a PUC approves the rates that utilities 
can charge their customers based on a rate base multiplied by a rate 
of return, then adding operation and maintenance costs, 
administrative and general expenses, depreciation, income and non-
income taxes, minus revenue credits.130 Due to the multiplier effect 
applied to the rate base, an important factor in such determinations 
is whether a particular asset would be included in the utility’s base 
rate, receiving the benefit of a multiplier effect, whether the costs can 
only be included as a pass-through charge without the multiplier 
effect, or whether only partial costs of the energy storage will be 
allowed.131 Without such clarification, investors may be unwilling to 
invest as large an amount of up-front capital. In these areas, “the role 
of power markets is limited to wholesale purchases or sales of power, 
 125. Energy markets establish a market clearing price for the electricity that balances 
load and generation at designated points on the transmission system.  
 126. Capacity markets provide payments to generators to ensure that sufficient 
capacity is built and maintained to serve system peak loads. Three of the seven RTO/ISOs 
have functioning capacity markets (PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE). 
 127. Ancillary services are specialized energy and capacity services that allow the ISO 
to operate the transmission grid and to respond to unanticipated contingencies such as the 
loss of a generator or transmission line. Glossary and Acronyms, ISO NEW ENGLAND, 
http://www.iso-ne.com/support/training/glossary/ (last visited June 14, 2014) (Ancillary 
markets facilitate transfer of those “services that support electricity transmission and 
reliable operations of the grid, such as load regulation, spinning reserve, non-spinning 
reserve, replacement reserve, and voltage support” and are only beginning to emerge as 
renewables gain traction in the markets). AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF 
THE SIX REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS (RTOS) 1 (2012) (In regions with 
operating RTOs or ISOs, “market participants buy and sell a variety of electricity products 
and services,” which has facilitated the creation of markets for electricity, capacity, and 
ancillary services). 
 128. ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 3 (n.d.), 
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf. 
 129. Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 
2010), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/. 
 130. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 18, at 6-7. 
 131. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY COST REPORT 10 (2012), 
available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/1C5DC9A9-3440-43EA-9C61-065FAD1 
FD111/0/AB67CostReport201.pdf. 
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which utilities undertake to supplement their cost-based generation 
activities. These wholesale power transactions contribute to but are 
generally not needed to allow regulated utilities to recover capacity-
related costs.”132  
 In restructured regions where there is retail competition, however, 
utilities are no longer vertically integrated, and generating facilities 
need to operate on a “merchant” basis.133 These generating facilities 
no longer recover costs through cost-of-service rates, but “through 
market-based (short- or long-term) bilateral contracts or spot market 
sales” in energy, ancillary, and capacity markets, where available.134  
(b)   Energy Storage as Transmission 
 In another sense, energy storage can be considered a transmission 
asset. Transmission assets aid in the reliability of the grid, provide 
voltage support, frequency regulation, and other load leveling 
functions.135 As discussed supra in Part II.B, energy storage can be a 
critical asset for providing exactly these functions, leading some to 
argue that it should be classified as such. As with a generation label, 
a transmission label carries with it jurisdictional and cost recovery 
implications—namely FERC jurisdiction and recovery under FERC-
approved rates. 
 132. JOHANNES PFEIFENBERGER ET AL., A COMPARISON OF PJM’S RPM WITH 
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY AND CAPACITY MARKET DESIGNS 13 (2009), available at 
http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/004/859/original/A_Comparison_of_PJ
M’s_RPM_with_Alt_Energy_and_Capacity_Mkt_Designs_Pfeifenberger_et_al_Sep_2009.pd
f?1379014789.  
 133. Id. In states that allow competition, the PUC still regulates distribution wires and 
oversees structured programs for competitive electric energy suppliers. REGULATORY 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 27-28 (2011), 
available at www.raponline.org/documents/download.id/. In addition, some restructured 
state programs require incumbent utilities to provide energy service at regulated rates to 
customers as a default provider. See, e.g., BARBARA R. ALEXANDER, THE TRANSITION TO 
RETAIL COMPETITION IN ENERGY MARKETS: HOW HAVE RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS FARED? 
PART ONE: AN ANALYSIS OF RESIDENTIAL ENERGY MARKETS IN GEORGIA, MASSACHUSETTS, 
OHIO, NEW YORK AND TEXAS 30 (2002) (noting the retention of incumbent utilities as 
Default Service providers in Ohio’s retail electric restructuring program); see also BARBARA 
R. ALEXANDER, DEFAULT SERVICE FOR RETAIL ELECTRIC COMPETITION: CAN RESIDENTIAL 
AND LOW INCOME CUSTOMERS BE PROTECTED WHEN THE EXPERIMENT GOES AWRY? 3 
(2002) (“[E]very state that has adopted electric restructuring has provided [Default 
Service]. . . . [It] is viewed as a regulated service . . . in every state and its price, and terms 
and conditions are subject to regulation by the state regulator of electric utilities.”). 
 134. PFEIFENBERGER, supra note 132, at 13. 
 135. ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 3; see also DHRUV BHATNAGAR & VERNE 
LOOSE, EVALUATING UTILITY PROCURED ELECTRIC ENERGY STORAGE RESOURCES: A 
PERSPECTIVE FOR STATE ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATORS 25-27, 37 (2012), available at 
http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2012-9422.pdf (discussing the different 
definitions and classifications of energy storage and explaining that FERC assesses the 
classification of energy storage devices on a case-by-case basis). 
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 Using its authority under the FPA, FERC had previously 
embarked on a series of rulemakings to realize the benefits of 
enhanced competition. It required unbundling of historically 
vertically integrated utilities into separate generation, transmission, 
and distribution facilities in restructured areas.136 As discussed 
previously, FERC created wholesale markets for generators and only 
retained control over those aspects of the utility industry at risk       
of monopolistic behavior, namely transmission assets.137 FERC 
established transmission tariffs that require open and non-
discriminatory rates and service for all generators.138 FERC tariffs 
determine how much money transmission system owners can earn 
from their transmission system, determine the structure of the 
transmission rates, and often determine who pays for upgrades to the 
transmission system.139  
 In 2005, Congress amended the FPA by adding § 219, directing 
FERC to develop incentive-based rate treatments for transmission 
“for the purpose of benefiting consumers by ensuring reliability and 
reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission 
congestion.”140 Congress also expressly made clear that energy 
storage was an “advanced transmission technology” eligible for 
incentive-based rate treatment, and directed FERC to encourage 
these technologies “as appropriate.”141 The amendment defined an 
“advanced transmission technology” as that which “increases the 
 136. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities 
and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter 
FERC Order No. 888]. 
 137. Id.; see also David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 765, 774 (2008) (discussing the history of unbundling of U.S. electricity 
markets). 
 138. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order 
No. 890-C, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228 (Mar. 19, 2009) (This “Order on Rehearing and 
Clarification” codified FERC Order No. 890 and supplemented Order Nos. 888 and 889 in 
order to clarify “certain revisions to its regulations and the pro forma open-access 
transmission tariff, or OATT, adopted in Order Nos. 888 and 889 to ensure that 
transmission services are provided on a basis that is just, reasonable, and not unduly 
discriminatory” and to increase transparency in the rules applicable to planning and use of 
the transmission system.); see also FERC Order No. 888, supra note 136. 
 139. MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO, NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, 
ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION: A PRIMER 55 (2004), available at http://www.puc.nh.gov/ 
Transmission%20Commission/Transmission %20Infrastructure/Appendix%20A.pdf. 
 140. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 219, 16 U.S.C. § 824s(a) (Supp. 2005). 
 141. Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 1223-24, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16422-23 (Supp. 2005) 
(including pumped hydro, compressed air, superconducting magnetic energy storage, 
flywheels, and batteries); Promoting Transmission Investment Through Pricing Reform, 
Order No. 679, 116 FERC ¶ 61,057 (July 20, 2006) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 679]. 
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capacity, efficiency, or reliability of an existing or new transmission 
facility, including . . . energy storage devices.”142  
 FERC complied with this directive in 2006 with Order No. 679, 
which embraced a more flexible approach to transmission rates. It 
allows “any transmitting utility or electric utility transmitting 
electric energy in interstate commerce that joins a Transmission 
Organization” to be eligible for incentive-based rate treatments.143 
FERC stated: 
Thus, for the Nation to be able to integrate the next generation of 
resources, we must encourage investors to take the risks 
associated with constructing large new transmission projects that 
can integrate new generation and otherwise reduce congestion and 
increase reliability. Our policies also must encourage all other 
needed transmission investments, whether they are regional or 
local, designed to improve reliability or to lower the delivered cost 
of power.144 
 Many types of energy storage qualify as “other needed 
transmission investments . . . designed to improve reliability or to 
lower the delivered cost of power.”145 In its final rule on incentive-
based rates, FERC expressly embraced advanced transmission 
technologies like energy storage as being “illustrative of the kinds of 
technologies that Congress sought to encourage . . . that may be 
employed and considered for incentive ratemaking treatment.”146  
 The label of an “advanced transmission technology” is far from 
dispositive as to its asset classification, however, as is evidenced   
from FERC’s treatment of a California pumped storage hydro 
facility.147 Even though FERC acknowledged that the 500 MW Lake 
Elsinore Advance Pumped Storage (LEAPS) project was an 
“advanced transmission technolog[y]” under the 2005 Energy Policy 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 16422(a)(11) (Supp. 2005).   
 143. FERC Order No. 679, supra note 141, ¶ 4. 
 144. Id. ¶ 25. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. ¶ 290. 
 147. The other relevant analysis would be to determine whether the energy storage 
entity seeking to take advantage of these rate incentives is a public utility, a question that 
turns on whether the entity is selling electric energy. 16 U.S.C. § 796(22) (Supp. 2005) (The 
Federal Power Act defines an electric utility as “a person or State agency (including [any 
municipality]) that sells electric energy. The term ‘electric utility’ includes the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and each Federal power marketing administration.”). Although this may 
not be a substantial issue for many energy storage developers because utilities are 
developing many of them, it may be particularly relevant for merchant energy storage 
facilities seeking to compete on a level playing field with incumbent utilities.  
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Act (EPAct),148 it declined to treat the facility as a transmission asset 
to be included in the CAISO Transmission Access Charge,149 saying it 
cannot support treating LEAPS differently than existing, similar 
generating units.150 But this Congressional amendment and 
subsequent FERC rulemakings mean that if energy storage is 
designated as transmission, it may be a FERC jurisdictional facility 
subject to transmission tariffs and eligible for market incentives.151 A 
transmission designation will also involve it in critical forthcoming 
transmission planning required by FERC’s recent Order No. 1000, 
which requires transmission providers to consider transmission 
needs driven by public policy requirements established by state or 
federal laws or regulations.152 As will be discussed infra, some states 
are already including energy storage into such “public policy 
requirements.” 
 Importantly, the label of transmission asset can also serve to limit 
the energy storage facility, both in terms of access to markets and 
ownership. First, if energy storage is treated as a transmission asset, 
market rules prohibit it from participating in wholesale energy and 
ancillary service markets, markets that have historically been served 
by generators to “maintain the independence of grid operators and 
avoid the potential for market manipulation, whether real or 
 148. Nevada Hydro Co., Order on Rate Request, FERC Doc. Nos. ER06-278-000 to -004, 
at 12 (Nov. 17, 2006), available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/111606/E-
5.pdf. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Id. at 5-6. Complicating matters was the fact that developers proposed to retain 
ownership of the facility but cede operational control to the transmission operator (in this 
case CAISO) and rely primarily on transmission system rights provided through 
transmission tariffs for their compensation). Id. at 3. Many rejected this proposal as 
presenting a conflict of interest for the ISO that was charged with neutrality as grid 
operator, including CAISO and FERC. Nevada Hydro Co., Order on Rate Incentives and 
Compliance Filings, 122 FERC ¶ 61,272, ¶¶ 59-63 (2008). In these systems, the RTOs and 
ISOs do not own any of the generation or transmission assets, but develop the rules to 
administer the markets, decide which generators will run at what levels, provide the 
transmission services needed for transactions to occur, and run the billing systems for 
payments for power. ROBERT H. SCHULTE ET AL., LESSONS FROM IOWA: DEVELOPMENT OF A 
270 MEGAWATT COMPRESSED AIR ENERGY STORAGE PROJECT IN MIDWEST INDEPENDENT 
SYSTEM OPERATOR: A STUDY FOR THE DOE ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS PROGRAM 79 (2012), 
available at http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/120388.pdf. 
 151. BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 139, at 53 (“If the transmission facilities fall under 
federal jurisdiction, [however,] the state commission generally must allow the utility to 
include its transmission costs in [its] rates.”). 
 152. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and 
Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 (July 21, 2011) (requiring 
each public utility transmission provider to participate in a regional transmission planning 
process that produces a regional transmission plan) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 1000]. 
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perceived.”153 Second, this asset classification may also have 
implications for ownership of the energy storage facility. For 
instance, in restructured regimes, the law requires utilities to divest 
their generation from their transmission and distribution,154 as is 
evidenced by ERCOT’s retail choice areas, where “a company cannot 
own both generation and transmission/distribution, except through 
separate affiliates under stringent code of conduct restrictions.”155 
The American Physical Society similarly concluded that “the ability 
of energy storage technologies to “cross traditional boundaries of 
generation, transmission and distribution . . . [p]aradoxically . . . 
could restrict its deployment [ ] due to the limitations placed             
on ownership.” 156 
 Regulators are starting to make these classification 
determinations with respect to energy storage that performs only one 
function. For instance, both the Wisconsin and Texas PUCs have 
approved energy storage projects that serve transmission 
functions.157 In both cases, the PUCs made sure to prohibit double-
counting, allowing the provider to recover transmission rates, but not 
participate in wholesale markets.158 Yet it is unclear how they will 
treat an energy storage facility that performs multiple functions. 
Energy storage developers may find themselves in a catch-22 
 153. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 34, at 11-12 (“Furthermore, FERC 
requires market power studies to be performed when third parties provide ancillary 
services at market-based rates to transmission providers . . . .”). 
 154. See Paul L. Joskow, Transmission Policy in the United States, 13 UTILS. POL. 95, 
96 (2005). 
 155. ELIZABETH DREWS, REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPACTS INVOLVING 
ELECTRICITY STORAGE IN TEXAS 5 (2012). 
 156. AM. PHYSICAL SOC., CHALLENGES OF ELECTRICITY STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES 18 
(2007). 
 157. See Roberts, supra note 55, at 48-49 (discussing the Rhinelander Loop and the 
Sodium-Sulfur battery installed in Presidio, Texas); ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., supra note 119, 
at 3. The Texas PUC approved its classification as a transmission asset subject to the 
company’s regulated cost of service transmission rates. Order Approving Application of 
Electric Transmission Texas, LLC for Regulatory Approvals Related to Installation of a 
Sodium Sulfur Battery at Presidio, Tex., No. 35944 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2009) 
[hereinafter Order Approving Electric Transmission’s Application, available at 
http://interchange.puc.state.tx.us/WebApp/Interchange/Documents/35994_114_613205.PDf; 
Application of Electric Transmission Texas, LLC for Regulatory Approvals Related to 
Installation of a Sodium Sulfer Battery at Presidio, Tex., No. 35994 (Tex. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n 2008), available at http://interchange.puc.state.tx.us/WebApp/ 
Interchange/Documents/ 35994_1_592495.PDF. 
 158. See Order Approving Electric Transmission’s Application, supra note 157, at 11 
(stipulating that the battery storage project at issue was correctly classified as a 
transmission asset alone, and not a generating facility capable of competing in wholesale 
markets, because “the . . . battery is a reactive device” that “does not generate electric 
power by converting another source of energy . . . into electricity,” but rather its “source of 
energy is power from the electric grid from which it stores and to which it later 
discharges”). 
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situation, since policymakers argue that for energy storage to reach 
its full market potential, its multiple functions all along the value 
stream need to be recognized.159 At the same time, employing 
multiple functions may generate more controversy and opposition to 
the project for fear of double-counting through both cost-based rate 
treatment and market-based rate treatment. The American Public 
Power Association, whose members are often wholesale customers of 
public utilities taking service under FERC-regulated wholesale and 
transmission rates, argued that storage projects “should not be able 
to recover their full costs of service through cost-based rates and then 
earn additional revenues through sales in other markets that are 
pocketed by project participants.”160 Opponents also argue that 
improperly characterizing energy storage as transmission is a back-
door attempt to socialize the fixed costs of generation.161  
 David Pomper has argued that FERC exercises jurisdiction over 
energy storage on the basis of its transmission services as opposed to 
wholesale transaction authority.162 He subscribes to longstanding 
jurisprudence about the bounds of transmission services, describing 
transmission as extending from where generation is complete to 
where the energy is subdivided to serve ultimate consumers.163 Under 
this interpretation, FERC would have jurisdiction over all the 
functions of energy storage, a result that might not occur if FERC 
exerted its jurisdiction based on whether the electricity entering or 
 159. Dhruv Bhatnagar, Sandia Nat’l Labs., Regulatory Challenges to the Integration of 
Energy Storage 4 (2013) (Powerpoint presentation) (identifying “functional classification 
restrictions” (“[b]lurring of the line between [asset] classifications”) as a challenge to 
energy storage and suggesting that “clarity and transparency in procedures to allow 
revenue recovery under multiple classifications” could serve as a solution). Additionally, 
without an apples to apples costs and benefits comparison, an energy storage project may 
not look cost-effective next to a new peaking generation facility or transmission line. 
 160. Jeannine Anderson, Rates to Pay for Energy Storage Devices Should Not Allow 
Cross-subsidization, APPA tells FERC, PUB. POWER DAILY (Aug. 20, 2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), http://www.naylornetwork.com/app-ppd/articles/index-
v2.asp?aid=12 4398&issueID=22651. The American Public Power Association also argued 
that “[s]haring costs of energy storage facilities between retail and wholesale rates could 
open the door to cross-subsidization of a utility’s retail customers by its wholesale 
customers . . . .” Id. 
 161. See, e.g., Brief of The Nevada Hydro Company in Response to the Administrative 
Law Judge’s Ruling Establishing Date for Service of Supplemental Testimony and Setting 
Briefing Dates Dated October 6, 2010, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, App. No. 10-07-001, at 19 
(Nov. 19, 2010), http://fronlinesonline.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/tnhc-initial-brief-
revised-december-11.pdf (“The intervenor compensation program socializes the intervenor’s 
costs among the utility’s ratepayers.”); Nevada Hydro Co., Order on Rate Request, supra 
note 148, at 9. 
 162. David E. Pomper, Pausing the Speed of Light: Rethinking the Basis for Federal 
Jurisdiction over Storage Services, ELECTRICPOLICY.COM 7-8 (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.spiegelmcd.com/files/Pomper_merged_ 2011_11_15_02_26_56.pdf. 
 163. Id. at 7. 
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exiting the storage facility is wholesale or retail.164 Pomper also 
argues that the jurisdictional and cost recovery aspects are not 
necessarily linked, providing an example of jurisdictional 
transmission facilities that have their cost allocated to generation 
customers or markets.165 In fact, Pomper goes as far as to argue that 
we should “recognize that storage is a form of transmission that, 
generally, should be regulated like generation.”166  
 In sum, cost recovery turns primarily on whether the energy 
storage facilities are labeled as generation, transmission, or 
distribution facilities. Generators are able to bid their electricity and 
sometimes their ancillary and capacity services into wholesale 
markets.167 Transmission operators, however, are subject to FERC-
regulated rates through established tariffs.168 To further complicate 
matters, some energy storage developers would not want to be 
pigeon-holed into one asset category or the other. In fact, some forms 
of energy storage will only be cost-effective if they can realize all of 
the benefits that energy storage can provide, benefits that spread 
across all three of these asset categories.169 For energy storage to 
maximize its value, however, it may be necessary for energy storage 
developers to seek cost recovery in both regulated cost-of-service and 
market-based regimes, subjecting it to both state and federal 
jurisdiction. The result can be both jurisdictional struggles of overlap 
and gaps, as well as risks of double-counting and inadequate 
compensation.  
III.   CHARACTERIZING THE REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY 
 Significant organizational theory literature exploring regulatory 
uncertainty exists. These scholars have spent decades defining 
uncertainty,170 differentiating various types of uncertainty,171 and 
 164. Id. at 8. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See, e.g., Market Products and Services Help Meet Demand, CAL. INDEP. SYS. 
OPERATOR, http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/ProductsServices/Default.aspx (last visited 
June 14, 2014) (explaining that “[s]cheduling coordinators can offer energy into the market 
from generating units” and “may participate in the ancillary services market”). 
 168. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 
67 (2011), available at http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP_Lazar_ElectricityRegulationIn 
TheUS_Guide_2011_03.pdf. 
 169. See EYER & COREY, supra note 29, at 18-21 (listing out seventeen applications for 
energy storage). 
 170. See, e.g., Milliken, supra note 17, at 134, 136 (citing different definitions of 
“environmental uncertainty,” meaning external to the organization, not environmental of 
the natural world variety). 
 171. See, e.g., Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland & Patrick Viguerie, Strategy Under 
Uncertainty, HARVARD BUS. REV., Nov. 1997, at 67, 68-71 (differentiating based on four 
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assessing organizational strategic responses to such uncertainty.172 
Of these efforts, only a subset addresses regulatory uncertainty 
specifically, and few, if any, identify criteria that are helpful in 
distinguishing between the different degrees of regulatory 
uncertainty that exist.173 This Part embarks on this mission—to 
begin a framework for characterizing different degrees (as opposed to 
types) of uncertainty. By degree, it means the relative state of the 
uncertainty, along a spectrum, that suggests that all regulatory 
uncertainty is not created equal. To do this, this Part uses the 
uncertainty associated with energy storage to identify factors that 
are important to assessing the degree of uncertainty.  
 Uncertainty runs the risk of alienating energy storage developers 
and impeding the deployment of the affected technologies.174 The 
most common reaction to such uncertainty is one of risk avoidance. 
This is understandable, as predictability is one of the cornerstones of 
the rule of law, providing stability and certainty for the regulated 
community.175 The risk averse nature of humans further contributes 
possible futures); Milliken, supra note 17, at 135-36 (differentiating perceived uncertainty 
into three types: state, effect, and response uncertainty); Birger Wernerfelt & Aneel 
Karnani, Competitive Strategy Under Uncertainty, 8 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 187, 189 (1987) 
(differentiating based on demand structure, supply structure, and competitors and 
externalities).   
 172. Christian Engau & Volker H. Hoffmann, Strategizing in an Unpredictable 
Climate: Exploring Corporate Strategies to Cope with Regulatory Uncertainty, 44 LONG 
RANGE PLAN. 42 (2011); Volker H. Hoffmann et al., Regulatory Uncertainty: A Reason to 
Postpone Investments? Not Necessarily, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 1227, 1227-29 (2009). 
 173. As Hoffman identifies, some scholars like Miles and Snow do distinguish between 
types of regulation (tax versus regulation, price setting versus product standards), but not 
to the level of detail at which this Article addresses uncertainty. Hoffmann et al., supra 
note 172, at 1237. Hoffman’s differentiation may be one of the closer characterizations of 
degree than type. Volker H. Hoffmann et al., A Taxonomy for Regulatory Uncertainty—
Application to the European Emission Trading Scheme, 11 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 712, 712-13 
(2008) (differentiating within one specific regulation based on basic direction, measures 
and rules, implementation process, and interdependence); Hoffman et al., supra note 172, 
at 1237 (differentiating based on current implementation, medium-term measures and 
rules, and long-term political direction); see also Guy L.F. Holburn, Assessing and 
Managing Regulatory Risk in Renewable Energy: Contrasts between Canada and the 
United States, 45 ENERGY POL’Y 654 (2012) (focusing on regulatory risks as opposed to 
regulatory uncertainty, but arguing that regulatory risks are lower in jurisdictions where 
regulatory agencies have greater autonomy and rigid policy-making processes).  
 174. See, e.g., AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2006 (“The Commission 
has noted on several occasions that regulatory uncertainty can discourage investment, and 
so unnecessary regulatory uncertainty should be avoided.” (quoting In re Amendment of 
the Comm’n’s Space Station Licensing Rules & Policies, 18 FCC Rcd. 10,760, 10,781 ¶ 45 
n.115 (2003))). 
 175. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 13,563, 13,563 (2011) (Our regulatory 
system “must promote predictability and reduce uncertainty.”); Kathryn A. Watts, 
Regulatory Moratoria, 61 DUKE L.J. 1883, 1922 (2012) (“[Nevada] Governor Sandoval 
asserted that ‘stable, consistent and predictable common sense regulation is vital to 
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to a desire for certainty.176 A wealth of literature supports the 
common sense notion that firms are less willing to invest where the 
returns are uncertain.177 Firms that cannot accurately predict future 
regulatory conditions are naturally more hesitant to invest 
significant amounts of capital. As has been noted in judicial 
proceedings, “[t]he general proposition that uncertainty about 
regulatory requirements affects market value is so intuitively 
obvious as to require no expert support.”178 Such reluctance to invest 
also can stifle innovation.179 “Regulatory uncertainty directly impacts 
innovation by hampering investment, and, therefore decreasing the 
amount of available capital that can be used for research and 
development.”180 Not surprisingly, therefore, uncertainty often is 
maintaining a regulatory environment that both secures the people and businesses of the 
state of Nevada and fosters economic growth.’ ” (citation omitted)).  
 176. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 908 (2011) (“People are often risk 
averse—that is, they prefer not to gamble.”); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming 
Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 562, 588 (1992) (“When substantial risk is involved, most people are risk averse: they 
tend to avoid gambles that pose the chance of catastrophic loss even when the chances of 
favorable outcomes are as great (or even greater) than the chances of catastrophic ones.”); 
Diane Klein, Distorted Reasoning: Gender, Risk-Aversion and Negligence Law, 30 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 629, 636 (1997) (“A person is risk-averse . . . if he strictly prefers a certainty 
consequence to any risky prospect whose mathematical expectation of consequences equals 
that certainty.” (citation omitted)). 
 177. See, e.g., Aswath Damodaran, Applied Corporate Finance: A User’s Manual, Third 
Edition, DAMODARAN ONLINE ch. 9, p. 17, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ 
New_Home_Page/ACF3E/appldCF3E.htm (last visited June 14, 2014) (“Since every risky 
investment or decision can potentially cause default, managers may hold back on 
committing to new investments that they perceive as uncertain.”).  
 178. Anatoli Rest., Inc. v. Dep’t of Highways, No. CIV.A.98-6220, 2001 WL 498960, at 
*5 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 26, 2001); see also David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, 
Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 835, 854 (2008) (“The questionable credibility of government commitments to future 
levels of regulation diminishes the capacity of environmental regulations to induce 
companies to invest in long-term research and development.”). 
 179. See, e.g., Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 685 
F.2d 459, 543 n.167 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (“The impact of regulatory uncertainty on the 
incentive of public utilities to innovate has been well-chronicled.”); Linda Cohen, 
Innovation and Atomic Energy: Nuclear Power Regulation, 1966–Present, 43 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 70-72 (1979) (time, expense, and uncertainty in acquiring NRC 
licenses are key factors inhibiting innovation); see also City of Chicago v. AT&T 
Broadband, Inc., No. 02 C 7517, 2003 WL 1888839, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2003) (“In order 
to facilitate our national policy goals, we seek to clarify the authority of State and local 
governments with respect to cable modem service . . . . [W]e seek to remove regulatory 
uncertainty that may discourage investment and innovation in broadband services . . . .” 
(citation omitted)); Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy 
Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35  HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (2011). 
 180. R. Alex DuFour, Voice over Internet Protocol: Ending Uncertainty and Promoting 
Innovation Through a Regulatory Framework, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 471, 487 (2005).  
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repeatedly blamed for inaction on a variety of matters.181 Energy 
storage is no exception. 
 In certain instances, blaming uncertainty for inaction is valid, 
particularly where the uncertainty reaches a degree where the scope 
of the uncertainty is paralyzing for both those internal and external 
to the situation and where eventual resolution is outside of the 
control of the stakeholders.182 But in other circumstances, 
uncertainty appears to be an undeserving scapegoat for inaction.183 
 Given the uncertainty surrounding energy storage, it seems 
important to develop a framework for assessing the degree of the 
uncertainty and to apply this framework to energy storage. This part 
asserts that uncertainty is far from a singular concept. Instead, it 
encompasses a spectrum of activity with varying causes, 
 181. See, e.g., Lyon & Li, supra note 19, at 2-3 (noting a number of examples of utilities 
decreasing price targets and declining investments due to regulatory uncertainty); Jess 
Davis, Dallas’ Inaction on Fracking Regs Driving Away Drillers, LAW360 (Jan. 23, 2013, 
5:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/408939/dallas-inaction-on-fracking-regs-driving-
away-drillers (describing how several exploration and production companies have 
withdrawn permit applications because of the city’s delay in issuing fracking regulations);   
Patricia Fleischauer, Regulatory Uncertainty Hindering Offshore Wind Development, 
ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.elp.com/articles/print/volume-
88/issue-2/sections/regulatory-uncertainty.html (describing the various regulatory factors 
that have held back development of offshore wind resources); U.S. RMBS Recovery Held 
Back by Regulatory Uncertainty, FITCH RATINGS (June 26, 2012, 11:34 AM), 
http://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/U.S.-RMBS-Recovery?pr_id= 
753601 (“[U]ncertainty relating to aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 has caused many 
traditional RMBS issuers to delay their issuance plans.”); Memorandum from Eric Cantor, 
Majority Leader of U.S. House of Representatives, to House Republicans, on Upcoming 
Jobs Agenda (Aug. 29, 2011), available at http://majorityleader.gov/blog/2011/08/memo-on-
upcoming-jobs-agenda.html (characterizing regulatory uncertainty as a form of “costly 
bureaucratic handcuffs” that produce a job-killing “cloud” over employers).  
 182. See, e.g., Kira R. Fabrizio, The Effect of Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment: 
Evidence from Renewable Energy Generation, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 765, 766 (2012) (finding 
that investment in new renewable generating assets in states with RPSs has been 
significantly lower in states with histories of regulatory repeal than those with no history 
of repealing restructuring legislation), Bill Frezza, Regulatory Uncertainty Drives a Fish 
Farmer to Foreign Waters, FORBES (Nov. 25, 2012, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billfrezza/2012/11/25/regulatory-uncertainty-drives-a-fish-farmer-
to-foreign-waters/ (chronicling a business owner’s decision to move his offshore deep water 
fish farming business to Panama in order to avoid the confusion and stress of overlapping 
state and federal regulations that would apply to his business in the United States, none of 
which acknowledge a lead agency or authority); See also discussion of Cape Wind, infra 
note 257. 
 183. See, e.g., Sidney Shapiro, The Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011: Way Too 
Much of a Good Thing, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2012, at 10, 11 (citing studies that 
refute claims that regulatory uncertainty is holding back the economy); Kevin Drum, 
Awkward Facts Kill the Regulatory Uncertainty Zombie, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 2, 2011), 
http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2011/10?page=16 (“Our problem is high debt 
levels and weak demand, not business-deadening regulations.”); Lawrence Mishel, 
Regulatory Uncertainty: A Phony Explanation for Our Jobs Problem, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.epi.org/publication/regulatory-uncertainty-phony-explanation 
(arguing that regulatory uncertainty is a poor explanation for the lack of jobs problem). 
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characteristics, and consequences. Implicit in this concept is an 
understanding that there are multiple varieties of uncertainty with 
differing degrees of impacts. Few examples of uncertainty are either 
“all bad” or “all good,” with most varieties reflecting some degree of 
both. An analysis of a specific variety of uncertainty will require a 
balancing of the drawbacks and virtues of that uncertainty in any 
specific situation.  
 To assist in categorizing uncertainty into places along a spectrum, 
this part identifies three variables critical to developing a useable 
framework for characterizing the different varieties of uncertainty: 
(1) the context surrounding the uncertainty, (2) the scope of the 
uncertainty, and (3) the source of the uncertainty, each of which is 
discussed below.184 This part applies this framework to energy 
storage uncertainty and advances a more accepting notion of 
uncertainty when three factors are present. Uncertainty is less 
troubling when it is operating in the context of high baseline levels of 
uncertainty, when it is limited in scope, and when the power to 
resolve the uncertainty resides in discrete sources, particularly when 
a federal source has intentionally chosen to embrace it and allows 
states to act to fill the void.  
A.   Context for Energy Storage Uncertainty 
 The first relevant factor to consider when categorizing uncertainty 
is the context of other uncertainty surrounding it. As Professor 
Milliken has explained, “[U]ncertainty . . . is likely to be partially a 
function of the characteristics of the environment in which the 
organization is operating.”185 Those organizations that function in a 
volatile and complex environment may perceive more uncertainty 
than those in simpler and more stable environments.186 Instead of a 
blanket reason for inaction, whether a specific uncertainty is likely to 
result in inaction depends in part on how risky that endeavor looks 
compared to the expected future value of other outcomes. Where all 
the alternatives have questionable expected future value, the 
marginal difference may be less relevant than where the uncertainty 
of one alternative is compared against options with more certain 
 184. “Some other elements of regulatory uncertainty that could be worth considering 
include: frequency of potential policy change (frequent or infrequent), type of compliance 
requirements (flexible/inflexible), and potential penalties for non-compliance (punitive or 
benign).” Adam R. Fremeth & Brian K. Richter, Profiting from Environmental Regulatory 
Uncertainty: Integrated Strategies for Competitive Advantage, 54 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 145, 
163 n.5 (2011). 
 185. Milliken, supra note 17, at 137. 
 186. Id. 
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future value.187 Therefore, the first parameter to be explored when 
trying to characterize uncertainty is the context within which that 
uncertainty operates. 
 In assessing context, this framework posits that uncertainty 
should be characterized through a comparison with a baseline level. 
Courts have acknowledged the importance of baseline levels of 
uncertainty in assessing elements of claims. For instance, in order    
to establish the element of causation, the plaintiff must show more 
than the existence of uncertainty after the taking; it must show     
that the 1998 taking, as distinct from those other events, brought 
about a measurable change in the level of uncertainty, so as to affect 
market value.188  
 Implicit in this assessment is an acceptance that uncertainty that 
exists against a high baseline level of uncertainty is not as 
troublesome as uncertainty amidst a relatively low baseline level of 
uncertainty.189 It is also important to remember that regardless of 
risks that regulations can eliminate, “a great deal of exogenous” risk–
risk outside of what regulations can eliminate–will always exist.”190 
For these reasons, context is important for making more realistic 
decisions about the proper response to the uncertainty. 
 The rest of this section assesses the uncertainty of energy storage 
against the baseline level of uncertainty surrounding the energy 
industry generally, with a specific focus on jurisdiction and cost 
recovery. It argues that these are two areas rife with high baseline 
 187. See, e.g., Warren G. Lavey, Making and Keeping Regulatory Promises, 55 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 1, 7 (2002) (discussing the investment choices industries face when confronted 
with regulatory uncertainty); see also Michael E. Sykuta, The Nature of the Deal in the 
Post-Crisis Financial Market, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 27, 35-38, 43 (2012) (discussing 
several sources of uncertainty that can affect investment and the value of different 
business transactions in such situations). 
 188. Anatoli Rest., Inc. v. Dep’t of Highways, No. CIV.A.98-6220, 2001 WL 498960, at 
*5 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 26, 2001) (rejecting claims because the regulatory uncertainty the 
plaintiffs faced failed to exceed the baseline level of regulatory uncertainty present before 
plaintiff began construction). 
 189. See, e.g., Nupur Chowdhury, Common Market but Divergent Regulatory Practices: 
Exploring European Regulation and the Effect on Regulatory Uncertainty in the Marketing 
Authorization of Medical Products, 35 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 635, 645 (2013) (comparing the 
regulatory uncertainty of pharmaceutical guidelines to that of the advanced therapy 
products and characterizing the level of uncertainty through comparison with a baseline 
level). 
 190. See generally Mordecai Kurz, Endogenous Uncertainty and Rational Belief 
Equilibrium: A Unified Theory of Market Volatility, in GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM: PROBLEMS 
& PROSPECTS 246, 246-48 (Fabio Petri & Frank Hahn eds., 2005) (distinguishing the 
“exogenous” from “endogenous” uncertainty as risk and volatility that arises from external, 
uncontrollable causes, including “weather conditions, earthquakes, technological changes, 
fire destruction etc.”). 
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levels of uncertainty—uncertainty that exists for all participants, not 
just those associated with emerging technologies. 
1.   Jurisdictional Context 
 Energy is a dynamic and often volatile field, resulting in 
regulatory uncertainties for all players involved. First, despite almost 
eighty years of FPA jurisprudence, the energy field is wrought with 
significant jurisdictional uncertainty. Under the FPA, FERC retains 
jurisdiction over wholesale electricity transactions and transmission 
rates, and states retain jurisdiction over retail electricity 
transactions and generation and distribution facilities.191 Despite this 
seemingly bright line drawn by Congress, there is no shortage of 
litigation that has ensued over line-drawing exercises between retail 
and wholesale classifications.192  
 Electric utilities dealing primarily with fossil fuel-related energy 
sources are far from immune from uncertainty.193 One example can 
be found in the latest jurisdictional struggle between FERC and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) over energy 
derivative “swap deals.”194 Both agencies are claiming jurisdiction, 
and commentators have suggested that “the routine use of swaps to 
hedge market volatility due to weather, unforeseen demand, and 
other factors would be severely disrupted if regulated by the 
 191. Section 201(a) grants FERC jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric energy 
in interstate commerce” and, therefore, over transmission rates. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
 192. Electricity transactions are considered wholesale or retail, depending on whether 
the sale is sold for resale (wholesale) or whether it is sold directly to an end user (retail). 
See, e.g., Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927) (holding 
that while states could regulate retail sales of electricity via the Commerce Clause, they 
could not regulate wholesale sales); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 603 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (holding that FERC failed to establish jurisdiction over CAISO netting rates); 
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. FERC, 955 F.2d 1412 (10th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the notion 
that if the state commission cannot have exclusive jurisdiction, it should, at minimum, 
have concurrent jurisdiction due to the “local” nature of the distribution); Brief for 
Respondent, Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 25, 2012), 
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/court-cases/briefs/2012/DC11-1486ElecPowerSupply 
Assoc.pdf (defending FERC’s characterization of demand response as a wholesale 
transaction subject to federal jurisdiction).  
 193. Although not jurisdictional regulatory uncertainty, another example of traditional 
energy sources being subject to regulatory uncertainty is coal. Although EPA has insofar 
only issued final carbon regulations for new fossil fuel plants, there is enough chatter about 
regulations for existing fossil fuel plants to generate regulatory uncertainty surrounding 
more traditional forms of energy products. Joanna M. Foster, EPA Publishes First Rule 
Limiting Carbon Pollution from New Power Plants, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 9, 2014, 12:48 
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ climate/2014/01/09/3139921/epa-carbon-rule-power-plants.  
 194. Thomas A. Utzinger, Energy Companies Moving Forward with CFTC Compliance 
Despite Uncertainties, REUTERS (May 31, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-
regulatory-forum/2012/05/31/energy-companies-moving-forward-with-cftc-compliance-despite-
uncertainties. 
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CFTC.”195 In addition to statutory and regulatory uncertainty, 
constitutional preemption principles can wreak havoc with local 
authorities’ exertion of authority over energy issues. This is well-
illustrated by the recent controversies surrounding local authorities’ 
bans on hydraulic fracturing that are being challenged by states 
under preemption grounds.196 Indeed, these few examples 
demonstrate that the jurisdictional uncertainty in the energy field is 
far from limited to emerging technologies.  
 Emerging technologies merely present ideal vehicles to challenge 
the jurisdictional limits. One recent example of an emerging energy 
service that has created jurisdictional uncertainty is demand 
response, customer-side curtailments in response to requests from 
grid operators. Because demand response occurs on the customer side 
of the meter, where states retain jurisdiction, many argue for state 
jurisdiction over demand response charges.197 FERC, however, has 
recently exerted jurisdiction over demand response charges through 
Order No. 745.198 In that Order, FERC treats demand response as the 
functional equivalent of producing energy for sale at wholesale, rates 
that are under FERC authority.199 Creating another layer of 
regulatory uncertainty, the D.C. Circuit vacated FERC’s Order No. 
745 as ultra vires regulation of the retail market in May 2014, a 
decision for which FERC is seeking en banc review.200  
 195. Id. 
 196. Sorell E. Negro, Fracking Wars: Federal, State and Local Conflicts over the 
Regulation of Natural Gas Activities, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Feb. 2012, at 1, 1-2, 
available at http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fracking-
Wars.pdf; See Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013); Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 964 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2013) (both holding New York’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law does not 
expressly or impliedly preempt municipal land use laws). 
 197. In EnergyConnect, Inc., 130 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2010), FERC determined that it 
“do[es] not regard agreements to provide services from only demand response resources to 
be jurisdictional facilities because they involve agreements to reduce demand, i.e., 
agreements not to purchase electric energy under certain circumstances, rather than 
agreements to sell electric energy at wholesale.” See Demand Response Compensation in 
Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter FERC Order No. 745]; see also Wholesale Competition in Regions with 
Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 125 FERC ¶ 61,071 (Oct. 17, 2008) (requiring 
ISO/RTOs to accept bids from demand response resources in markets for certain ancillary 
services on a basis comparable to other resources). 
 198. See FERC Order No. 745, supra note 197. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. 2014), available 
at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/DE531DBFA7DE1ABE85257CE100 
4F4C53/$file/11-1486-1494281.pdf; FERC to Seek en banc Review of Demand Response 
Ruling, FERC (June 11, 2014), https://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2014/2014-2/06-
11-14.asp#.U7Gm5xaC22w; see also Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n v. FERC, 668 F.3d 735 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (upholding FERC’s approval of an RTO tariff aimed at demand response 
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 2.   Cost Recovery Context 
 Second, cost recovery is governed by a complex web of both 
regulated and restructured mechanisms, all of which are laden with 
inherent uncertainty. Traditional cost-of-service can involve a 
substantial risk of cost recovery of capital expenditures. As discussed 
above, public utility commissions allow utilities to recover under cost-
of-service formulas based on the fixed and variable costs, coupled 
with a profit. Utilities are generally expected to make investments 
before they know how much will be recovered and how quickly. In 
fact, recovery of these investments usually does not begin until after 
the facility is operational.201 Much like the FPA, most state 
regulation of utility rates incorporates a statutory “just and 
reasonable” standard, a vague standard imbued with uncertainty 
itself.202 Recovery is governed by one or a mixture of a “prudent 
investment” and a “used and useful” standard, which has led to 
varying disallowed costs.203  
 Years of failed investments in nuclear power facilities, for 
instance, led to a body of law on stranded investments, as did the 
transition of some states from regulated to restructured retail 
electricity regimes.204 Although FERC Order No. 888 now grants the 
measures, holding that the PUC had not met its burden of proof that the tariff 
impermissibly blurred the line between state and federal jurisdiction under the Federal 
Power Act); Hon. Jon Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of 
Demand Response: The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 28 ENERGY 
L.J. 389, 405 (2007) (“[T]o the extent that demand response can be characterized as 
involving such a wholesale sale of electric energy, it would fall within the Commission's 
jurisdiction under the FPA . . . [and] the Commission may facilitate demand response in 
wholesale markets because demand response directly and significantly affects wholesale 
rates.”). 
 201. Russell A. Feingold, Regulatory Uncertainty: The Ratemaking Challenge 
Continues, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 2004, at 52, 54, available at 
http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2004/11/regulatory-uncertainty-ratemaking-challenge-
continues?page=0%2C1 (“[M]anagement has forgotten that utilities must invest in 
infrastructure and then file rate cases to earn on the investment.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). A few allow for preapprovals by the PUC. See SCOTT HEMPLING & SCOTT 
H. STRAUSS, PRE-APPROVAL COMMITMENTS: WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS SHOULD 
REGULATORS COMMIT RATEPAYER DOLLARS TO UTILITY-PROPOSED CAPITAL PROJECTS? 15-
19 (2008) (discussing various options utilized by state PUCs for implementing pre-
approved cost recovery). 
 202. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (West 2013) (“All charges demanded or 
received by any public utility . . . shall be just and reasonable.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-
101(b) (2012) (“Every electric public utility governed by this act shall be required . . . to 
establish just and reasonable rates . . . .”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-810 (2012) (“Rates shall 
be just and reasonable.”).  
 203. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (disallowing millions 
of dollars invested in nuclear plants that were never completed due to changing market 
conditions).  
 204. See, e.g., FERC Order No. 888, supra note 136 (noting that “the construction of 
nuclear and other capital-intensive baseload facilities—actively encouraged by federal and 
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right to recovery of stranded costs associated with wholesale 
transmission and distribution of electricity, there is still uncertainty 
about the legitimacy and valuation of such costs.205 “On one hand, 
neither regulation nor the Constitution guarantee utilities a right to 
profits; on the other hand, consumers may pay high retail prices 
where regulators approve expensive utility actions.”206  
 The uncertainty faced by energy storage is not so far above the 
baseline level of cost recovery uncertainty in the industry such as to 
render it a complete obstacle to its development. For instance, FERC 
has expressly noted that the possibility of stranded costs caused by 
administrative errors is not unique to energy storage. “This 
possibility exists throughout the utility industry and is not uniquely 
attributable to utilities with energy storage operations.”207  
 In fact, an argument can be made that the likelihood of cost 
recovery for energy storage is even more likely. Although some forms 
of energy storage like CAES may be as expensive as or more 
expensive than traditional forms of energy infrastructure to 
construct, other forms of energy storage can cost significantly less 
than the alternatives. One example can be found in Wisconsin, where 
the PUC installed a magnetic energy storage system to upgrade its 
transmission line for stability, where the energy storage “provided 
the very short duration needed at roughly one tenth the cost and a 
faster, less intrusive installation” than alternative transmission 
upgrades.208 Although this project sought cost recovery through 
FERC-regulated transaction rates, such a shorter start-up time 
means there is even less chance for the rules to change, and it is less 
likely that they could become “un-used” and “un-useful” prior to cost 
recovery in traditional regulated regimes.  
some state governments—contributed to the continuing cost increases and uncertainties in 
the industry” and “[b]etween 1985 and 1992, writeoffs of nuclear power plants totalled 
$22.4 billion,” significantly reducing the earnings of the affected utilities); see also Town of 
Norwood v. FERC, 80 F.3d 526 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (where ratepayers sought review of a 
FERC order allowing a utility to recover 100% of its unamortized investment in a nuclear 
plant after the utility shut down the plant before its license expired); Jersey Cent. Power & 
Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (where a utility sought review of a 
FERC order modifying the utility’s rate schedule to exclude a $397 million investment in a 
nuclear power plant that was cancelled after construction commenced); CenterPoint 
Energy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 143 S.W.3d 81, 82-83 (Tex. 2004) (summarizing 
the stranded cost predicament of utilities following the partial deregulation of the Texas 
electric power industry in 1999).  
 205. FERC Order No. 888, supra note 136.  
 206. Mark Wiranowski, Competitive Smart Grid Pilots: A Means to Overcome Incentive 
and Informational Problems, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 361, 382 (2012). 
 207. FERC Order No. 784, supra note 12, ¶ 134. 
 208. ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 3.  
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 In sum, energy stakeholders operate in a world with a significant 
baseline level of uncertainty, one in which investors nonetheless see 
fit to move forward with energy infrastructure. The uncertainty 
caused by an emerging technology like energy storage is not 
sufficiently outside the range of reasonable uncertainty that exists 
for many players in the energy industry.  
B.   Scope of Energy Storage Uncertainty 
 A second relevant factor to aid in the characterization of 
uncertainty is the scope of the uncertainty involved. Scope refers to 
the extent of the impact caused by the uncertainty, which can include 
an assessment of short-term and long-term uncertainty. The varying 
scope and time-scale relevance has been recognized by Professor 
Hoffman, who has divided uncertainty into three categories that 
encompass “current implementation, medium-term measures and 
rules, and long-term political direction.”209 The narrower the range of 
impacts to the regulated entities, the less troublesome the scope.210  
 In one sense, the scope of the uncertainty faced by energy storage 
is expansive. The classification of energy storage affects not only the 
return on investment, but whether the project can even proceed. In 
this manner, the uncertainty of emerging technologies is distinct 
from that of existing technologies. Although one could characterize it 
as how cost recovery will proceed, the fact that there are multiple 
value streams incompatible with both regulated and market-based 
recovery means that there is also a chance that energy storage 
developers will not be able to obtain any cost recovery for certain 
aspects of a given energy storage technology.211 But this uncertainty 
can be classified as short-term “current implementation” uncertainty, 
one that must be compared with the longer-term uncertainty. 
 In another sense, the scope of uncertainty faced by energy storage 
developers is continually being narrowed. Beyond the federal 
 209. Hoffman et al., supra note 172, at 1237.  
 210. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case 
of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1509-10 (2007) (“Regulatory uncertainty that 
are broad in scope may impose substantial costs.”). As an example, pollution control 
statutes like the Clean Air Act mandate an agency to develop air quality standards for six 
specific criteria pollutants, but there may be regulatory uncertainty about how exactly 
those standards will be determined and what exactly those standards will be. The cost 
differential between one type of standard and another type of standard may be substantial, 
but narrower than the difference between complying with a standard and not having to 
comply at all. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1990). 
 211. Cf., e.g., Morgan Lee, SDG&E’s Request to Recover 2007 Fire Costs Denied, UNION-
TRIBUNE SAN DIEGO (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/Oct/16/sdges-
request-to-recover-2007-fire-costs-denied/ (rejecting utility’s costs to respond to fire damage 
in an opinion from the California Public Utilities Commission). 
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classification of energy storage, investors can look to other proxies to 
provide confidence in the federal regulatory treatment of energy 
storage. There are many other signals that investors should take into 
account beyond whether a federal agency will conclusively determine 
the proper asset classification label for an emerging technology. This 
is particularly important in determining the longer-term political 
direction. “To the extent that waiting leads to the resolution of some 
of the relevant regulatory uncertainty, the firm may face an option 
value to delaying investment.”212 But where a primary reason is to 
gather further assurances about the “state’s commitment” to the 
cause, other proxies are important.213 In this case, it is relevant 
whether FERC is taking any other action, positive or negative, with 
respect to energy storage.214 This evaluation reveals that FERC is 
moving forward in ways that demonstrate its market support for 
energy storage, effectively narrowing the scope of uncertainty. As a 
government report indicated: 
If the entity is in a centrally dispatched market like MISO, the 
ISO needs to have sufficient tariffs and other market mechanisms 
in place to enable the storage owner to achieve the full value of the 
benefits available from all of the storage facility’s attributes. In the 
absence of such tariffs and market mechanisms, many of the 
potential benefits of the storage facility will go un-monetized, or 
will accrue to the benefit of market participants other than the 
storage owners.215 
 Effective market treatment for energy storage is particularly 
important since “much of the nation’s energy infrastructure is now 
owned or being developed by independent power producers who lack 
utility-rate base cost recovery structures” and rely exclusively on 
market-based rates for recovery of their costs.216 Accordingly, FERC 
has claimed jurisdiction over some of these energy storage services, 
 212. Jun Ishii & Jingming Yan, Investment Under Regulatory Uncertainty: U.S. 
Electricity Generation Investment Since 1996, 6 (Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts., 
Working Paper No. 137, 2004), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/ 
csemmwp12.pdf. 
 213. Id. 
 214. For a legislative perspective, see S. Res. 1030, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted), S. 
Res. 795, 113th Cong. (2011) (enacted), and S. Res. 1845, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted). 
 215.  SCHULTE ET AL., supra note 150, at 79; see also DENHOLM ET AL., supra note 15, at 
9 (The government has suggested that “perhaps the single greatest motivation for 
proposals to build new energy storage is the creation of markets for both energy and 
ancillary services including regulation, contingency reserves, and capacity.”).  
 216. Comments of the National Hydropower Association on the June 16, 2011 Notice 
Inquiry Re Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting and Financial           
Reporting for New Electric Storage Technologies, FERC Dkt. Nos. RM11-24-000 and AD10-
13-000, at 8-9, available at http://www.hydro.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/NHA-
Comments-on-Ancillary-Services-NOI-Final.pdf. 
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issuing important rulemakings to enhance facilitation of energy 
storage services onto the grid.  
 First, in 2007, FERC issued Order No. 890, which required 
wholesale markets to consider non-generation resources (including 
storage and distributed resources) for grid services.217 The order 
required that these non-generation resources be evaluated on a 
comparable basis to services provided by generation resources in 
meeting mandatory reliability standards, providing ancillary 
services, and planning the expansion of the transmission grid. This 
was an important recognition of the importance of non-traditional 
resources like energy storage, demand response, combined heat and 
power, and variable energy resources (renewables).218 
 Second, in 2011, FERC issued Order No. 755, requiring 
jurisdictional utilities to pay a premium for “faster-ramping 
resources” for regulation service, citing energy storage as an example 
of a technology that is not currently valued appropriately.219 In the 
ISO and RTO markets, compensation for frequency regulation service 
is presently based on several complicated components.220 FERC has 
found that “current frequency regulation compensation practices of 
RTOs and ISOs result in rates that are unjust, unreasonable, and 
unduly discriminatory or preferential” and has finalized new rules 
for frequency regulation services intended to level the playing field 
for energy storage.221 In response to this order, a number of market 
operators have created new tariffs allowing storage to participate in 
ancillary service markets that resulted in expanded deployment of 
“124 MWs of energy storage by the end of 2012.”222  
 217. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order 
No. 890, 118 FERC ¶ 61,119 (Feb. 16, 2007) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 890].  
 218. Comments of the Electricity Consumer Resource Council, FERC Dkt. No. AD10-
13-000, at 3, available at http://www.elcon.org/Documents/FERCFilings/2010/FERC8-9-
10.pdf (“The threshold issue before FERC is the need to retool resource eligibility 
standards and to adopt the tariff and market rule changes that will enable access to 
wholesale power markets by non-traditional resources.”). 
 219. See FERC Order No. 755, supra note 68, ¶¶ 5, 11.  
 220. Id. ¶¶ 6-10.   
 221. Id. ¶ 2; FERC has noted that “current compensation methods for regulation 
service in RTO and ISO markets fail to acknowledge the inherently greater amount of 
frequency regulation service being provided by faster-ramping resources.” Id. With the 
exception of ISO-NE, the RTOs and ISOs limit compensation to frequency regulation 
resources to a capacity payment and net energy balancing. Id. ¶¶ 6-10. Until recently, the 
rate paid for frequency regulation services supplied by traditional fossil-fuel plants and 
gas-fired turbines was the same as the rate paid to fast-ramping storage systems such as 
batteries and flywheels. Id. ¶ 2. 
 222. ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 60, at 15. For example, Midwest ISO created a 
stored energy resources tariff. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., Order 
Conditionally Accepting Stored Resources Compliance Filing, 131 FERC ¶ 61,128 (May 10, 
2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20100510142914-ER09-1126-
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 Additional steps are being taken to address these potential 
problems in lieu of regulatory clarity on classifications. In July 2013, 
FERC expanded its rulemakings affecting energy storage with Order 
No. 784.223 In addition to payment premiums provided for in Order 
No. 755, Order No. 784 now requires each public utility transmission 
provider to take into account the speed and accuracy of regulation 
resources in its determination of reserve requirements, two 
parameters where energy storage excels.224 It also amends a 
historical restriction to now allow energy storage to provide ancillary 
services to transmission providers at market-based rates where 
appropriate.225 Despite its embrace of uncertainty with respect to the 
classification of energy storage, FERC explicitly found that “there is 
a need for certainty in the accounting and reporting treatment for 
energy storage assets and operations, especially in instances where 
utilities seek to recover costs of energy storage operations in cost-
based rates.”226 In response, FERC issued a final accounting 
rulemaking that requires separate accounts for energy storage within 
each of the traditional asset categories to better allow FERC to 
“monitor these utilities’ operations to prevent and discourage cross-
subsidization between cost-based and market-based activities.”227 
 Most recently, FERC issued Order No. 792, which revised the pro 
forma Small Generator Interconnection Agreement and Procedures 
to specifically include energy storage devices.228 The revisions are 
designed to establish terms and conditions for public utilities to 
provide just and reasonable interconnection service for small 
generators.229 This amendment to the original Order No. 2006 adds 
energy storage to the category of resources that are authorized to use 
these procedures or a fast track interconnection process and provides 
clarification on the sizing of storage devices.230  
001.pdf. Also, the New York ISO created a limited energy storage resource tariff. N.Y. 
Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Order Accepting Tariff Revisions, 127 FERC ¶ 61,135 (May 15, 
2009), available at http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/Files/20090515142559-ER09-836-
000.pdf.  
 223. FERC Order No. 784, supra note 12. 
 224. Id. ¶ 1; see supra text accompanying notes 71-72. 
 225. Id. ¶ 9, 13. 
 226. Id. ¶ 124. 
 227. Id. ¶ 125 (Comments on the notice of proposed rulemaking demonstrate a 
wariness for increased administrative burdens, and alternative suggestions were to record 
the cost of an energy storage asset in a single plant account and allocate its cost to the 
various functions it performs using current ratemaking methods.). 
 228. Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 792, 145 
FERC ¶ 61,159, ¶ 1 (Nov. 22, 2013) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 792].  
 229. Id. ¶ 2. 
 230. Id. ¶ 227-31. 
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 Despite FERC’s embrace of uncertainty with respect to asset 
classification, FERC’s actions taken as a whole are not representative 
of an agency that is sitting on its hands, generating inconsistent 
outcomes, or otherwise fostering a high-risk, unsupportive 
environment for energy storage. On the contrary, as energy storage 
counsel has indicated that “[t]he main message that FERC is 
sending . . . is that we need these technologies, and markets should 
send signals that say we need them, we’re going to pay for them. If 
companies are making money and can repay their shareholders, then 
more will invest.”231 Uncertainty in some short-term and long-term 
areas should be weighed against each other. For instance, although 
there is uncertainty about “current implementation” surrounding 
energy storage, these efforts demonstrate there is less uncertainty 
about the “long-term political direction” of energy storage.232 This 
suggests that investment in energy storage should come despite 
uncertainty in some areas, so long as there are other signals that 
provide them some comfort. 
C.   Source of Energy Storage Uncertainty 
 A third factor to assist in the characterization of uncertainty is the 
source of the certainty. Regulatory uncertainty can result from a wide 
variety of sources, including vague regulations,233 agency inaction,234 
inconsistency in agency positions,235 agency changes in regulatory 
 231. Michael T. Burr, What Happened at Beacon: Election Politics Almost Killed a 
Great Idea, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, May 2012, at 4, 6, available at 
http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2012/05/what-happened-beacon. 
 232. Hoffman et al., supra note 172, at 1237. 
 233. The Supreme Court, for example, was recently obliged to resolve regulatory 
vagueness under the Clean Water Act in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense 
Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337 (2013), where it overturned a Ninth Circuit determination 
that logging road ditches and culverts are point sources that require a permit under the 
Clean Water Act. Justice Scalia, in dissent, delivered a powerful indictment of vague 
agency regulations, arguing that agencies are incentivized to issue vague rules because 
“the power to prescribe is augmented by the power to interpret . . . .” Id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 234. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Global Climate Change and Regulatory Uncertainty, 9 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 259, 263 (1992) (discussing the regulatory uncertainty caused by 
delayed regulation of an action like climate change). Definitive federal fracking 
regulations, for example, have been held in a sustained state of regulatory limbo as EPA 
completes studies investigating groundwater contamination and methane leakage 
associated with hydraulic fracturing. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Energy Res. Conservation & 
Dev. Comm’n, 197 Cal. Rptr. 866, 877-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (The court noted that while 
stakeholders are waiting for the commission to make its jurisdictional determination, “[t]he 
attendant delay, expense, and uncertainty might well create regulatory havoc.”).  
 235. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 179, at 39 (noting regulatory uncertainty that can 
result from governmental commitments of questionable credibility that had been 
previously revoked); see also United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 
1141 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining that an agency “remains free to hear new arguments, 
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goals,236 changes in agency administrators,237 judicial action reviewing 
agency action or rulemakings, and some combination of the above.238 
Governmental actors can even be both the source239 and the recipient240 
of uncertainty, depending on the circumstances. Furthermore, 
make adjustments, and change directions” without having to undergo notice and comment 
because it “commits itself to a particular interpretation of its own regulation only when it 
adopts that interpretation definitively . . . .”); John Miller, EPA Reverses Course, Nixes 
Idaho Pollution Rule, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 25, 2013, 10:43 AM), 
http://news.yahoo.com/epa-reverses-course-nixes-idaho-144345912.html (discussing the 
reversal of a state water quality rule that was approved by EPA two years prior).  
 236. It is common practice for the EPA to make various regulatory goals more stringent 
in response to updated scientific findings. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVIEW OF 
THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR OZONE: POLICY ASSESSMENT OF 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 6-81, available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/ 
standards/ozone/data/2007_07_ozone_staff_paper.pdf (concluding that new scientific 
information supported tightening NAAQS ozone standards); see also Juliet Eilperin, EPA 
Tightens Soot Rules By 20 Percent, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.washington 
post.com/national/health-science/epa-to-tighten-soot-rules-by-20-percent/2012/12/14/5d39c0 
c0-4541-11e2-8061-253bccfc7532_story.html. But see, e.g., Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, 
Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency 
(Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/EPA_Return_Letter_9-2-
2011.pdf (rejecting EPA’s proposal to revise the air quality standard for ozone based in part 
on the “needless” regulatory uncertainty that would result from revising the standards 
when another revision was anticipated in the near future). 
 237. Andrew B. Whitford, The Reduction of Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence From 
Transfer Pricing Policy, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 269, 273 (2004) (“Regulatory uncertainty may 
come in the form of variations in antitrust policy with changes in administration or 
environmental policy due to changes in social tastes for protection.”). EPA provided 
regulatory certainty on the question of the EPA’s authority to regulate carbon dioxide 
under the Clean Air Act only to be reversed when a subsequent EPA Administrator took 
office, a decision that was later reversed by the Supreme Court. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497 (2007); Memo from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to EPA 
Regional Administrators (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/ 
psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf. 
 238. Patrick MacElroy, Four Keys to Managing Regulatory Uncertainty, BLACK & 
VEATCH, http://bv.com/Home/news/thought-leadership/security-and-risk-management-
issues/four-keys-to-managing-regulatory-uncertainty (last visited June 14, 2014) 
(“Regulatory risk can take many forms, including legislation, court action or changes in 
regulatory goals.” (citation omitted)); see also Chowdhury, supra note 189, at 637 (“Sources 
of ambiguity may include the structure and substance of the norms themselves, or the 
institutional mechanisms that enforce those norms, the lack of a clear adjudicatory 
mechanism in case of dispute over interpretation of those norms, etc. Herein it is important 
to underline that, since regulations change over time—it is a dynamic activity—
uncertainty is therefore endemic to every regulatory system.”). In addition, see the D.C. 
Circuit’s recent reversal of FERC’s order regarding demand response supra note 200. 
 239. Shapiro, supra note 183, at 10 (describing the federal legislature’s bill that would 
add 2 to 2.5 years to the rulemaking ossification, thereby increasing regulatory 
uncertainty). 
 240. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An 
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1430 (2012) (“The mere fact that OMB can reverse a regulatory 
decision might also inject significant uncertainty into the regulatory process, further 
discouraging the agency from acting.”). 
                                                                                                                                        
746  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:697 
 
uncertainty is not a static concept. Even those seemingly certain 
regulations run the risk of becoming uncertain.241  
 Other scholars point to the failure of law to keep pace with 
technology, creating lags that generate pockets of uncertainty.242 A 
survey of utility leaders, for instance, indicated that “regulatory 
uncertainty most often is caused by lack of longer-term direction and 
progression of regulatory decisions, unanticipated actions by 
regulators and their impact upon a utility’s current business 
strategies, . . . the potential for costs disallowances,” inconsistent 
application of policies by state regulators, and lack of regulator 
understanding of key issues facing utilities.243 Uncertainty can be the 
result of one or more of these circumstances. 
 The source of uncertainty affects its treatment in at least two key 
respects. First, uncertainty may be less troublesome in cases where 
the regulator has intentionally embraced the uncertainty to harness 
its positive virtues than where the uncertainty has been thrust upon 
the regulated community due to a confluence of multiple 
circumstances. This is consistent with the biases that taint our 
 241. For instance, consider the EPA’s proposed rule on the treatment of air pollution 
that migrates across state borders. The agency strived to reduce the uncertainty of the 
rule, engaged in notice and comment rulemaking, and issued a final rule. Rule To Reduce 
Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule), 70 
Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78 and 
96). Despite this illusion of certainty, the D.C. Circuit struck down the rule just three years 
later. North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The EPA’s second attempt at 
a revised rule in 2011 was again struck down by the same court. Federal Implementation 
Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP 
Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 51, 72, 78 
and 97); EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also 
Kenneth Colburn, Least-Risk Planning, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 2012, at 38, 41, 
available at http://mag.fortnightly.com/display_article.php?id=1241684&_width= (The D.C. 
Circuit’s rejection of the EPA’s cross-state air pollution rule served “to perpetuate the 
profound regulatory uncertainty clouding the future of the electric power sector. At a time 
of great change in the energy industry, when substantial energy infrastructure 
investments are needed nationally and energy technology is a growing basis for 
international competitiveness, chronic regulatory uncertainty can have sclerotic economic 
consequences.”). 
 242. See, e.g., Gary E. Marchant et al., What Does the History of Technology Regulation 
Teach Us About Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 724, 726-27 (2009) (“Lyria 
Bennett Moses has identified four potential problems that may result from the failure of 
law to keep pace with technology, including: (1) the failure to impose appropriate legal 
restrictions and precautions to control the risks of new technologies; (2) uncertainties in 
the application of existing legal frameworks to new technologies; (3) the potential for 
existing rules to either under- or over-regulate new technologies; and (4) the potential for 
technology to make existing rules obsolete.”); see also Feingold, supra note 201, at 53 
(“Interestingly, more than 90 percent of survey respondents either strongly agreed or 
agreed with the proposition that regulatory uncertainty is caused by the energy market 
changing at a faster pace than the related regulatory policies that establish the rules of the 
game in the marketplace.”). 
 243. Feingold, supra note 201, at 53. 
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decisionmaking. For instance, one bias is a tendency to discount risks 
that are undertaken voluntarily and to exaggerate risks that are 
imposed upon us.244 Similarly, stakeholders may discount the risks of 
uncertainty that are intentionally and voluntarily embraced. But 
such intentional, structured uncertainty may be partially justified by 
an agency’s efforts to harness some of the advantages of uncertainty, 
including flexibility and the allowance of market-driven development. 
 Arguably the largest benefit of uncertainty is its ability to be 
flexible and responsive to varied facts and changing circumstances. 
Courts and agencies have repeatedly embraced agency case-by-case 
analyses in a number of contexts, driven largely by a desire to be 
flexible yet narrowly tailored to prevent a broadly applicable 
alternative that could both under-regulate and over-regulate.245 Case-
by-case treatment allows states and federal regulators to experiment 
with decisions that have individual impacts instead of risking an 
entire industry through sweeping regulations.246  
 The flexibility that accompanies this type of uncertainty is 
consistent with scholars who have emphasized the importance of 
adaptive mechanisms when dealing with emerging technologies. As 
Professor Buzbee has noted, although legal stability and knowable 
legal obligations are essential, there is a “stability-innovation 
 244. Cass R. Sunstein, A Note on “Voluntary” Versus “Involuntary” Risks, 8 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 173, 173-74 (1997) (noting that even though car accidents are more 
likely than airplane crashes, people discount the risk of car accidents because they have a 
greater sense of control over that risk); see also Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 
F.2d 672 (1973). See generally Lennart Sjöberg, Factors in Risk Perception, 20 RISK 
ANALYSIS 1, 2-3 (2000). 
 245. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (articulating the 
importance of both agency decisionmaking processes) (“[T]he agency must retain power to 
deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be 
effective. There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory 
standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad 
hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative 
agency.”); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910, 919 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming 
EPA’s use of a case-by-case analysis under the Clean Air Act to determine the RMRR 
under PSD modifications). 
 246. Importantly, such case-by-case treatment is distinct from inaction, which raises 
particularly pernicious questions of dereliction of duty on the part of regulators to address 
an urgent problem. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Groups Sue After E.P.A. Fails to Shift Ozone 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/science/ 
earth/12epa.html (rejection by the Obama Administration of stricter ozone pollution 
standards); Five Groups Sue EPA Over Punt on Biogenic Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 
P’SHIP FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.pfpi.net/five-groups-sue-epa-over-
punt-on-biogenic-greenhouse-gas-regulation (withdrawal of regulations on biomass carbon 
emissions); Groups Sue EPA After Agency Pulls Clean Water Act Enforcement, NAT’L 
SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/epa-cafo-
lawsuit/ (withdrawal of proposed regulations on concentrated animal feeding operations). 
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tradeoff.”247 In this case, even if innovations and improved results are 
possible, “legal strategies and resulting obligations” become solidified 
and are “seldom revisited.”248 Professor Mandel has suggested that 
“[o]ne method for achieving adaptability and flexibility is for 
emerging technology governance to include mechanisms that allow 
for incremental changes in governance as the need arises.”249 He 
highlights one of the benefits of emerging technologies in that it 
“often means that interests and organizations have not yet fully 
vested around a particular system or become wedded to a status 
quo.”250 Professor Mandel recommends that “[a] particular system of 
governance should be developed, followed by data gathering, followed 
by result evaluation, followed by modifications to the system as 
warranted, in a continuing cycle until industry and scientific 
understanding has matured.”251  
 Another benefit of uncertainty may be its ability to yield to the 
market. This is particularly important where an emerging technology 
is at issue. These technologies involve extremely high capital 
intensity and infrastructure dependence, an uncertain revenue 
stream that depends on regulatory decisions, uncertainties about the 
technology’s performance and the regulatory context at scale, and a 
complex value-chain needing coordinated action from multiple 
relevant parties.252 If the government were to intervene with a 
precise classification before the technology has matured, developers 
might tailor their investment decisions to the regulations as opposed 
to the market.253 For instance, they might shape their investment 
 247. William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and Disappointments: Lessons for 
Climate Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
33, 35 (2010). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 LAW, INNOVATION & 
TECH. 75, 89 (2009). 
 250. Id. at 81; Belinda Bennett, Expanding Horizons: Scientific Frontiers, Legal 
Regulation, and Globalization, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 524 (2012) (“[I]t is 
important to accept that a legal solution may only be temporary. This means accepting that 
laws may need to be subject to regular review, and possibly regular change, in response to 
new needs and new knowledge.”).  
 251. Mandel, supra note 249, at 89 (proposing options in final rules to avoid 
Administrative Procedure Act limitations on evolving regulations). 
 252. See, e.g., Varun Rai et al., Carbon Capture and Storage at Scale: Lessons from the 
Growth of Analogous Energy Technologies, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 4089, 4089-90 (2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1400163. 
 253. See id. at 4092 (“The optimal conditions for a technology’s validation exist when 
the strategic interests of government and businesses align.”); Elizabeth Burleson & 
Winslow Burleson, Innovation Cooperation: Energy Biosciences and Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 651, 679 (“Governments have a crucial role to play in . . . open innovation.”). But see 
Gaia J. Larsen, Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies Fail to Induce 
Innovation to Reduce Social and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 150 
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decisions to avoid certain classifications or invest in those 
technologies that are treated more favorably by the agency. 
Regulating with too much specificity also has the potential to favor 
known existing technologies at the potential expense of unknown 
future technologies. In short, choosing a classification at this early 
point in the commercialization of energy storage may influence firm 
behavior in a way that is not the most beneficial.  
 Using traditional regulatory tools to drive technological 
innovation requires detailed knowledge about the desired course of 
technological change and what sorts of innovations are likely or 
foreseeable.254 But government regulators rarely have the necessary 
information or foresight to drive innovation this way. Where the 
government is uncertain of either the technology or the best future 
use of the technology, it may make sense to allow other factors to 
drive these decisions. “Even if regulators were to identify a proper 
target initially, the regulatory process changes so slowly that 
regulatory standards would be unlikely to keep up with technological 
change or account for new information.”255 Instead of being driven   
by regulatory definitions, some uncertainty allows technologies to     
be driven by demand. In short, the government needs to send     
signals that it believes in the value of the emerging service, but      
not regulate so narrowly that it drives how or which precise 
technology develops to provide that service. This is not to say that 
intentional uncertainty will always yield positive results,256 but that 
(2012) (explaining that the market alone does not foster enough innovation and that the 
government must intervene to influence technological innovation). 
 254. The International Energy Agency, for example, recently promulgated an 
implementing agreement between thirteen countries in order “to formulate effective 
policies that increase production and trade in [energy efficient appliances and equipment].” 
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, TECHNOLOGY-FORCING STANDARDS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY: 
EFFICIENT ELECTRICAL END-USE EQUIPMENT (4E), at ii (2012). The Agency noted that far-
reaching regulatory action concerning end-use electrical equipment was justified because 
technology-forcing standards for appliances would likely enable research and development, 
bring forward significant technology changes, and provide industry long-term regulatory 
certainty. Id. at v. 
 255. Adler, supra note 179, at 37.  
 256. Jon C. Dubin, Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and 
Bureaucratically Rational Gap-Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security 
Administration’s Disability Programs, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 944 (2010) (finding that 
although the Social Security Administration’s application of disability rules was intended 
to provide clarity, it instead led to inconsistent results, rendering severely disabled 
claimants, such as epileptics or psychotics, ineligible for benefits while rendering much less 
disabled claimants, such as arthritics, eligible); Andrew A. Lundgren, Sarbanes-Oxley, 
Then Disney: The Post-Scandal Corporate-Governance Plot Thickens, 8 DEL. L. REV. 195, 
199 (2006) (pointing to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an example of legislation designed to 
grant flexibility but produced a climate that is “exactly the opposite of what Congress 
intended to do.”).  
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there is a better chance for positive results when risks are 
undertaken than when risks are imposed.   
 Second, uncertainty may be less troublesome where there is 
unilateral as opposed to multiple sources. Uncertainty that is an 
involuntary confluence of multiple factors outside the control of any 
one actor is more troublesome than uncertainty that is intentionally 
embraced by a single actor. Multiple sources render it less likely that 
the uncertainty can be easily resolved and increase the transaction 
costs of reducing the uncertainty from multiple sources. To 
demonstrate this point, one need only look to the Cape Wind fiasco. 
In that situation, the stakeholders involved in developing the nation’s 
first offshore wind farm experienced uncertainty from a myriad of 
sources, including the Department of the Interior, the state of 
Massachusetts, and even the Federal Aviation Administration, 
resulting in decade-long delays.257  
 Applying this factor to energy storage reveals a more discrete and 
manageable source of uncertainty. FERC responded to this 
uncertainty with an explicit embrace of it, declining to resolve the 
issue with general applicability and instead approaching each unique 
energy storage technology on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis. FERC 
has stated that “electricity storage devices, in a general sense, do not 
readily fit neatly into either of the traditional functions of generation, 
transmission or distribution.”258 Similarly, FERC Commissioner 
Moeller has said, “Our overall view is that energy storage is unique 
and doesn’t fit neatly into the distribution or transmission box.”259  
 For FERC to do otherwise may have been criticized as premature. 
Regulating with more certainty at this point in the emerging 
technology cycle may have caused more damage than good. It would 
have eliminated the flexibility inherent in the current case-by-case 
analyses and could have thwarted creativity and market-driven 
moves on the part of energy storage developers. For instance, if 
 257. See Jay Lindsay, APNewsBreak: FAA Felt Offshore Wind Farm Pressure, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 15, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-faa-felt-
offshore-wind-farm-pressure (describing confusion over FAA’s efficacy of modifications 
required    for FAA permitting and subsequent allegations that FAA’s ultimate permitting 
decision was politically motivated); Tom Zeller, Jr., Cape Wind: Regulation, Litigation and 
the Struggle to Develop Offshore Wind Power in the U.S., RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM 
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/02/cape-wind-
regulation-litigation-and-the-struggle-to-develop-offshore-wind-power-in-the-u-s?page=4 
(noting the novelty of offshore wind permitting and confusion as to whether the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers or the Department of the Interior held responsibility for the project’s 
environmental review). 
 258. Western Grid Development, L.L.C., 133 FERC ¶ 61,029, ¶ 11 (Oct. 12, 2010). 
 259. Eric Wesoff, FERC’s Commissioner on Energy Storage, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 
18, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-view-from-ferc-on-energy-
storage. 
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FERC had expressly delineated the type of energy storage that 
satisfied their definition of a generation asset, firms may have 
tailored their investment towards those types of energy storage even 
if the grid was more in need of others.260 By the same token, in 
addition to reaping some of the virtues of uncertainty, the singular 
source suggests that resolution of the uncertainty at a later point in 
time could be swift. 
 In sum, this Part demonstrates that the uncertainty associated 
with FERC’s determination for energy storage is not sufficiently 
troublesome to justify inaction. Unlike many other types of 
uncertainty, this uncertainty was not caused by the juxtaposition of 
multiple actors or circumstances. On the contrary, the uncertainty 
surrounding energy storage was intentionally embraced, with an eye 
toward rendering the best outcomes, as regulators and stakeholders 
become familiar with the different energy storage technologies, 
values, and purposes. When the critical features of uncertainty are 
analyzed it becomes clear that this uncertainty is consistent with the 
general uncertainty that surrounds the energy industry, that the 
scope is narrower than other types of uncertainty, and that the 
source of the uncertainty is one federal agency intentionally seeking 
to reap the advantages of energy storage in a world where the law is 
struggling to keep up with the technology. 
IV.   STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING THE REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY 
SURROUNDING ENERGY STORAGE 
 Political scientists have developed considerable organizational 
theory literature on the response of “the firm” to regulatory 
uncertainty.261 In the simplest sense, the analyses can be categorized 
into four major response strategies: (1) avoid the uncertainty 
(2) ignore the uncertainty, (3) adapt to the uncertainty, or 
(4) advocate for more clarity to reduce the uncertainty.262 The choice 
of response is affected in part by the type of uncertainty facing the 
firm, but as Professor Hoffman and her co-authors have observed, 
“investment decisions cannot be viewed solely from the perspective of 
 260. See Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 55-56. 
 261. See, e.g., Alfred Marcus et al., Firms, Regulatory Uncertainty, and the Natural 
Environment, 54 CAL. MGMT REV. 5, 5-6 (2011).  
 262. Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 55 (arguing that “firms pursue four 
objectives when responding to regulatory uncertainty, seeking to either avoid, reduce, 
adapt to, or disregard this uncertainty”).  
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regulatory uncertainty,” and there are certainly other factors that 
trump this uncertainty.263  
 An avoidance strategy is usually reserved for the riskiest of 
endeavors.264 As Professors Engau and Hoffman remark, “[H]igh 
regulatory uncertainty is more difficult to cope with than low 
regulatory uncertainty, therefore forcing firms without sufficient 
coping capacity to avoid uncertain regulatory environments and to 
shift their business to more predictable ones.”265 Avoiding the 
uncertainty usually involves postponing decisions, waiting for more 
clarity to prevent errors, or withdrawing completely from the 
enterprise.266 This response is generally adopted by smaller firms 
experimenting with suspect technology that has not yet gained large-
scale public commitment.267  
 Ignoring the uncertainty involves adopting a “no regrets policy,” in 
which, unsure of how government regulations will affect the firm’s 
future, they adopt as many strategies as possible at once.268 This 
strategy is reserved for firms that are large enough to have a 
substantial reserve to adopt multiple strategies, allowing for success 
regardless of any regulatory outcome.269  
 Adapting to the uncertainty is reserved for firms whose success is 
threatened by the uncertainty of changes coming from new legislative 
actions.270 The choices a firm makes in adapting its response to such 
 263. Hoffman et al., supra note 172, at 1244 (identifying timing, complementary 
resources, and institutional pressure as other factors that can counter a response that 
postpones investments). 
 264. Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 59 (“[F]irms exposed to high regulatory 
uncertainty will avoid this uncertainty to a greater extent than firms facing low regulatory 
uncertainty.”); Chowdhury, supra note 189, at 637 (“[O]nly when regulatory uncertainty 
reaches unmanageable proportions does it challenge and undermine the effectiveness of 
the regulatory system as whole.”). 
 265. Engau & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 59. 
 266. See id. at 56; see also Summit Farm, Inc. v. Comm’r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1240, 1243 
(T.C. 1981) (There is “considerable legislative and regulatory uncertainty concerning 
whether this plastic container would be banned in Minnesota. . . . [P]rudence and good 
business judgment prompted Summit to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.”). 
 267. Marcus et al., supra note 261, at 9-10 (giving an example of petro-algae, an 
immature technology today, as it remains unclear as to whether sufficient progress will 
ever be made to justify its commercialization). 
 268. Id. at 9 (explaining that an electric utility, for example, may be unsure of how 
government regulations will affect future energy prices and thus begin using multiple 
forms of energy—coal, natural gas, wind, renewable, and nuclear). A similar concept is an 
anticipator response. Christian Engau et al., Airlines’ Flexibility in Facing Regulatory 
Uncertainty: To Anticipate or Adapt?, 54 CAL. MGMT. REV. 107, 117 (2011). 
 269. Marcus et al., supra note 20, at 9 (noting that electric utilities may have the 
financial reserves to adopt such a strategy but that start ups in energy efficiency may not 
have similar reserves and will thus be unable to adopt the strategy). 
 270. See, e.g., Nancy M. Carter, Small Firm Adaptation: Responses of Physicians’ 
Organizations to Regulatory and Competitive Uncertainty, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 307, 307-08 
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uncertainty largely depends on costs—in these situations, firms aim 
to limit costs such as “loss of autonomy, increased dependency, and 
increased uncertainty.”271  
 Advocating for more clarity is used by those who are likely to 
benefit from such an investment. These firms participate in the 
policy process themselves, with the aim of influencing 
policymakers.272 Contrary to an avoidance strategy, where a 
stakeholder may stay away until more information is available, an 
advocacy strategy seeks to enhance the effectiveness of the eventual 
decision by actively acquiring more information to narrow the scope 
of the uncertainty. Ernst & Young has documented an advocacy 
response for firms exposed to uncertainty from climate change: “The 
companies interviewed in this survey indicate a strong preference for 
more regulatory certainty, but to a large extent, they are not waiting 
for clarity and are positioning their businesses accordingly.”273 
 Importantly, one strategy may not be right for every type of 
energy storage stakeholder involved. The prior analysis in Part III 
demonstrates that energy storage uncertainty does not rise to the 
level deserving of complete withdrawal from energy storage. Energy 
storage’s foothold demonstrates that there are sufficient varieties 
that would not be classified as “suspect technologies.” Furthermore, 
the nation’s energy grid cannot afford such a wait-and-see approach.  
 By the same token, energy storage stakeholders should not pursue 
a “business as usual” approach that does little to track developments 
on energy storage. This is particularly true of stakeholders operating 
in traditional cost-of-service jurisdictions, where the prudence of 
investments is carefully evaluated.274 It is important that these 
stakeholders not turn a blind eye to the uncertainty they face so      
as not to find themselves making decisions that a PUC may            
find imprudent.  
(1990). This type of strategic flexibility has also been analyzed in Engau et al., supra note 
268, at 117-20. 
 271. Carter, supra note 270, at 308. 
 272. See, e.g., Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 172, at 48-49. See generally Amy J. 
Hillman et al., Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda, 30 J. MGMT. 
837 (2004); Brian Schaffer, Firm-Level Responses to Government Regulation: Theoretical 
and Research Approaches, 21 J. MGMT. 495 (1995). 
 273. ERNST & YOUNG, ACTION AMID UNCERTAINTY: THE BUSINESS RESPONSE TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (2010), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ 
Action_amid_uncertainty_-_The_business_response_to_climate_change/$FILE/EY_Action_ 
amid_uncertainty_-_The_business_response_to_climate_change.pdf. 
 274. See, e.g., Violet v. FERC, 800 F.2d 280, 281 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities found that Edison Electric was imprudent in 
not cancelling a project once the “increased costs due to licensing delays, regulatory 
requirements, and uncertainty surrounding various other aspects of the project” had 
become “intolerably high”).  
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 It is possible that the strategy being deployed by a number of wind 
farm developers could be categorized as “ignoring” the uncertainty. 
This strategy involves capitalizing on the existence of complementary 
resources, which can cause decisionmakers to invest despite a high 
level of regulatory uncertainty.275 Many wind farms are pursuing this 
strategy, pairing energy storage with their wind farm resources 
already in existence.276 Their ability to capture profits on their wind 
farms can only increase with energy storage, but these entities have 
diversified the risk to the extent that they will still profit regardless 
of the energy storage component.  
 Similarly, some stakeholders may be seen as adapting to the 
uncertainty facing storage. For instance, utilities in California have 
been approved to build “permanent load shifting” demand response, 
which is really a form of energy storage. By adapting its terminology 
to that already accepted within the regulatory framework, these 
utilities were able to seek approval for storage as part of their 
demand response funding.277   
 This Article urges energy storage stakeholders to engage in more 
advocacy responses.278 As Professor Mandel has said, “[i]nstead of 
allowing the scientific and regulatory uncertainty to produce 
stagnation . . . it may be possible to leverage the uncertainty to 
achieve a more positive outcome.”279 Energy storage developers could 
even benefit from investments in the face of regulatory uncertainty 
“if they gain a first-mover advantage.”280 This Part provides some 
advocacy strategies for energy storage stakeholders to function 
 275. Hoffmann et al., supra note 172, at 1244. 
 276. Notrees (Tex.), Xcel (Minn.), Laurel Mountain (W. Va.) and Tehachapi (Cal.) are 
all wind farms employing energy storage. See Jeff St. John, Grid-Scale Energy Storage:       
4 Ways to Grow in 2014, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Grid-Scale-Energy-Storage-4-Ways-to-Grow-
in-2014. 
 277. See, e.g., Decision Authorizing Long-Term Procurement for Local Capacity 
Requirements, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 12-03-014, at 2 (Feb. 13, 2013), 
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M050/K374/50374 
520.PDF (approving Southern California Edison’s 2013 capacity procurement plan and 
imposing a requirement that 150 MW be procured through “preferred resources,” including 
demand response); see also S. CAL. EDISON, PERMANENT LOAD SHIFTING PROGRAM 1, 
https://www.sce.com/wps/wcm/connect/a4e1543d-1cc7-46b3-8cf2-920cf3aa66af/SCE_PLS_ 
ProgramGuides_20140205.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited June 14, 2014) (explaining 
that Permanent Load Shifting “focuses on cooling [thermal energy storage] systems” in 
which “[c]ooling is produced and stored during the time when energy charges are lower and 
discharged at a later time when energy and peak demand charges are high”). 
 278. Cf., e.g., Reuters Ltd. v. FCC, 781 F.2d 946, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (documenting 
the “assault” on the Commission to resolve regulatory uncertainty over the uses of 
microwave radio stations when applications lay dormant at the Commission). 
 279. Mandel, supra note 249, at 76. 
 280. Hoffmann et al., supra note 172, at 1228. 
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within the uncertainty, as well as some suggestions for federal 
regulators to facilitate these efforts. 
A.   Strategies for Energy Storage Stakeholders to Function Under 
Regulatory Uncertainty  
 Implicit in both advocacy and adaptation strategies are 
affirmative actions to reduce or manage the extent of the uncertainty. 
Advocating for clarity requires a significant expenditure of capital, 
but FERC already has begun engaging with stakeholders on ways to 
properly integrate energy storage into the existing legal regime. For 
instance, stakeholders have proposed a number of solutions to resolve 
this asset classification uncertainty, including squeezing technology 
into one of the three existing categories,281 creating an entirely new 
fourth category for energy storage,282 or retaining the status quo.283 
This section suggests additional pathways for stakeholders to 
advocate for clarity. First, stakeholders can reduce uncertainty by 
harnessing the benefits of federalism and seeking state initiatives to 
fill the gap left by FERC. Second, stakeholders can petition FERC for 
affirmative rulings on jurisdictional or cost recovery questions. Third, 
stakeholders can continue to pursue additional funds for energy 
storage research and development to generate more information that 
further reduces the uncertainty. Each of these forms of actively 
reducing uncertainty is discussed below. 
1.   Harness the Benefits of Federalism 
 The first advocacy strategy for investors considering energy 
storage is to evaluate and encourage state actions that may drive 
certainty. An oft-discussed benefit of our federalist system is the 
ability of states to step in and fill a void left by the federal 
government.284 Where the federal government is hesitant to provide 
 281. See, e.g., LUONG, supra note 19, at 21, 29 (“[T]ransmission is the most discussed 
and controversial market for energy storage participation.”). 
 282. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 34, at 16 (“NHA recommends 
further evaluation of treating bulk energy storage as a separate and distinct electricity 
infrastructure asset class (i.e., Balancing Asset or Compensating Asset), capable of 
relieving grid stresses through the absorption of excess energy during low demand periods 
or rapidly providing capacity during periods of peak demand.”). 
 283. See LUONG, supra note 19, at 33 (“Increasing the renewable energy supply will 
eventually create needs for energy storage to supplement all components of the grid 
[including generation, transmission, and distribution markets]. As such, it follows that its 
roles be carved out within the existing energy market structure. A new energy storage 
asset category is not needed.”). 
 284. See, e.g., Shawna Bligh & Chris Wendelbo, Hydraulic Fracturing: Drilling into the 
Issue, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2013, at 7, 8-12 (exploring the proliferation of 
state fracking regulations in the absence of any comprehensive federal action). 
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clarity on an issue, as is the case with FERC, state legislatures and 
PUCs may act to force the issue. Although state initiatives with 
respect to energy storage could generate inconsistencies that drive 
stakeholders to appeal to the federal government for relief or 
clarification,285 state initiatives may also be effective in establishing a 
path forward toward certainty. This may occur through successful 
state legislative or PUC programs that gather additional information 
or begin to coalesce around a more unified set of rules. 
 One example can be found in California, the first state to move 
toward providing more certainty for energy storage investments. In 
2010, California passed the Energy Storage Law (AB 2541), which 
requires publicly-owned and investor-owned utilities to procure grid-
connected storage systems where appropriate.286 The new law directs 
the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to open a 
proceeding to determine appropriate targets, if any,287 for each load-
serving entity to procure viable and cost-effective energy storage 
systems.288 The law provides that an energy storage system is 
designed to “reduce the need for new fossil-fuel powered peaking 
generation facilities” and to “provide the ancillary services” fossil 
fuels had been providing,”289 but it otherwise defines an “energy 
storage system” broadly to include centralized or distributed, or 
ownership by a utility, customer of utility, or merchant third-party, 
but with the requirement that it must reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, reduce demand for peak generation, or improve the 
reliable operation of the transmission or distribution grid.290 In 
February 2013, the CPUC began implementation of this law by 
requiring that fifty MW of Southern California Edison’s long-term 
capacity requirements come from energy storage by 2021.291 In 
October 2013, the CPUC continued to implement the energy storage 
 285. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 210, at 1500 (“[S]tates can be important catalysts 
of a federal policy response by stimulating both pro-regulatory and anti-regulatory forces to 
appeal to the federal government for relief sooner rather than later.”). 
 286. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2835(f) (2010) (such energy storage can be acquired 
through ownership or a contractual right to purchase electricity from a third party). 
 287. Notably, the bill could have set the procurement target at zero, largely 
eviscerating the impact of the law. The procurement targets must be “viable and cost 
effective.” Id. § 2836(a)(1). 
 288. Id. § 2837(c), (h). The law required the proceeding by March 1, 2012, adoption of 
an energy storage system procurement target by October 1, 2014, and attainment by 
December 31, 2016, and a second target to be achieved by December 31, 2020. Id. 
§ 2836(b)(1)-(2).  
 289. Id. § 2837(c), (h).  
 290. Id. § 2835(a)(1)-(3). 
 291. Decision Authorizing Long-Term Procurement for Local Capacity Requirements, 
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 12-03-014, at 2 (Feb. 13, 2013), available at 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M050/K374/50374520.PDF. 
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mandate for all of California’s investor-owned utilities by approving 
more procurement targets and mechanisms totaling 1325 MW            
of storage.292  
 Such mandates can provide important protection for investors who 
will be subject to cost of service recovery evaluations. They protect 
investors from the discretion of PUCs that are often unwilling to 
approve rate requests involving technologies that exceed those 
required by law.293 Rejected as overkill that harms the ratepayers, 
these new technologies are often exactly the type of innovation being 
encouraged on other policy levels. Past efforts to bet on the winners 
of technologies that are not yet mandated have often left utilities 
disappointed. Instead, utilities are now counseled to wait to 
implement technologies until they are mandated and not jump ahead 
of the regulatory curve.294 
 Despite the benefit of mandates for utilities, such mandates also 
generate risks. Notably, such mandates do the exact opposite of the 
benefit of uncertainty cited above—whereas uncertainty allows the 
market to pick winners instead of the government, mandates allow 
the government to pick the winners.295 Such technology-forcing 
endeavors have been widely criticized in the literature, running the 
 292. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC Sets Energy Storage Goals for 
Utilities (Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/ 
G000/M079/K171/79171502.PDF (Announcing Decision Adopting Energy Storage 
Procurement Framework and Design Program, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 10-
12-07 (Oct. 17, 2013), in which the CPUC established a combined energy storage target of 
1325 MW for three large utilities.) For perspective, 1325 MW (1.3 GW) is enough to power 
185,000 homes (and enough to power the fictional DeLorean time machine featured in 
Back to the Future (1.21 GW). See Joshua S. Hill, Norway Greenlights 8 Wind Farms to 
Triple National Capacity, CLEAN TECHNICA (Aug. 28, 2013), http://cleantechnica.com/ 
2013/08/28/norway-greenlights-8-wind-farms-to-triple-national-capacity/.  
 293. See, e.g., Investigation of Merrimack Station Scrubber Project and Cost Recovery, 
N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Order No. 25,398, 2012 WL 3548030, at *1 (Aug. 7, 2012) 
(allowing recovery of scrubbers as required by air pollution laws); Application of Va. Elec. 
& Power Co., Va. Corp. Comm’n, PUE-2012-00052, 2012 WL 3200605, at *4 (Aug. 2, 2012) 
(allowing recovery of demand response programs required by FERC); see also David 
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New 
Jurisprudence or Business As Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 47 (2012) (“[T]he regulatory 
requirements pertaining to emission of GHGs (or in many cases, the lack thereof) have had 
a significant effect on the outcome of permit proceedings and the reasoning of 
decisionmakers.”). 
 294. See, e.g., MacElroy, supra note 238 (noting how Congressional inaction on carbon 
“left early adopters of carbon technologies without the market incentives needed to make 
them competitive”). 
 295. “SDG&E argued against mandated targets, saying they would be a barrier to cost-
effective deployment of storage: ‘It is inappropriate, premature and difficult to establish a 
proper and cost-effective deployment level and ratepayers should not be burdened with the 
cost of uneconomic storage projects installed simply to meet a mandated target.’ ” Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, Energy Storage Procurement Workshop 4 (Jan. 14, 2013) (remarks of San 
Diego Gas & Electric).  
                                                                                                                                        
758  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:697 
 
risk of forcing technology that is not yet ready for commercialization 
or picking a winner when another option turns out to be better.296 
The cumulative impact of such mandates on utilities should also be 
considered, as many states are already subject to mandates for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, generating backlash.297 
Forcing these technologies too soon could result in disaster, with 
utilities being forced to invest in higher-risk technologies than they 
would otherwise invest in. Others have urged the inclusion of escape 
valves in case the target is set too high for technology to keep up, as 
the California energy storage mandate does, requiring the target to 
be reevaluated every three years.298 Regardless of the outcome of 
California’s experiment in federalism, such state actions can serve as 
a catalyst toward ultimately resolving the uncertainty. 
 A second example can be found in Texas, where the state stepped 
in to provide regulatory clarity for energy storage. Texas is in a 
unique regulatory position, being the only state among the forty-
eight contiguous states with its own interconnection, excluding itself 
from FERC jurisdiction.299 Although it does not address energy 
storage serving as a transmission asset, Texas has explicitly 
identified energy storage used to sell energy or ancillary services as 
generation for cost recovery purposes.300 “Texas already deployed the 
nation’s biggest sodium-sulfur (NaS) battery, which can power 4,000 
residents in Presidio, Texas, for up to eight hours during an 
outage.”301 The utility, S&C Electric Co., is using a PureWave Storage 
 296. But cf., e.g., MATTHEW DEAL ET AL., CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ELECTRIC ENERGY 
STORAGE: AN ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 8 (2010) (The 
California PUC has acknowledged that it needs to “[c]ompare the costs and benefits of 
various types of EES with those of other load-shifting and emissions reduction strategies 
(including energy efficiency, demand response, and renewable energy procurement), in 
order to determine how ratepayer funds can be optimally committed.”). 
 297. See, e.g., John Funk, FirstEnergy Wants to Cap Ohio Energy Efficiency Mandates, 
Arguing Costly Market Interference, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 26, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012/11/firstenergy_wants_to_cap_ohio.html 
(describing the Ohio utility that is desperately seeking a legislator to sponsor their bill 
freezing the energy efficiency mandates); Kyle Rosas, Energy Storage Required, BLACKLE 
MAG. (Oct. 2, 2012), http://blacklemag.com/technology/the-importance-of-energy-storage/ 
(noting that in California, the energy storage mandate was opposed by all three major 
utility companies—Pacific Gas & Electric, Edison, and Sempra—as well as the consumer 
group Division of Ratepayer Advocates).  
 298. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2836 (2011). 
 299. Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/ 
industries/electric/indus-act/rto/ercot.asp (last updated Oct. 17, 2011). 
 300.  TEX. UTIL. STAT. ANN. § 35.152 (West 2011) (“Electric energy storage equipment 
or facilities that are intended to be used to sell energy or ancillary services at wholesale are 
generation assets.”); see also Project #39917, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., 
http://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/projects/rules/39917/39917.aspx (last visited June 14, 
2014). 
 301. Roberts, supra note 55, at 48. 
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Management System to control the system, including storing grid 
power and dispatching it back to the grid as needed. “This is the first 
time a state PUC has allowed rate-based recovery for a distributed 
energy storage project.”302 As stakeholders have indicated,  
“[w]ithout the right pressure from the Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC), grid-scale utility storage will remain a good idea that will 
likely never get implemented.” Ed Cazalet of Megawatt Storage 
Farms alluded to utilities that claim, “ ‘We can’t sign this storage 
contract until we have a regulation telling us to do that.’ ”303 
2.   Encourage FERC to Develop Case-by-Case Precedent 
 A second strategy for functioning within this uncertainty involves 
stakeholders approaching FERC for advance orders on case-specific 
projects. FERC can assert jurisdiction over energy storage through 
either its authority over transmission services or through its 
authority over wholesale electricity transactions. Energy storage 
developers also can use FERC’s processes to obtain affirmative orders 
from FERC regarding their specific asset classification situation, 
reflecting another advocacy response.  
 There are already a few examples of developers seeking an 
affirmative declaration from FERC that their energy storage 
facilities qualify as wholesale transactions under FERC jurisdiction 
or as “transmission assets” justifying incentive-based rates. In 
Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C., FERC held a compressed air energy 
storage facility was subject to its exclusive jurisdiction under section 
201 of the FPA through its jurisdiction over wholesale electricity 
rates.304 This compressed air facility converted non-storable electric 
energy to storable compressed air, a process known as the 
conversion/storage cycle.305 FERC held it was this conversion/storage 
cycle that separated the storage facility from other facilities that 
consume energy that is sold for end use, an action outside the 
Commission’s jurisdiction.306 It reached this decision by comparing 
the compressed air facility to pumped storage hydroelectric facilities, 
which are traditionally subject to FERC jurisdiction under section 
201.307 A compressed air facility, like a pumped storage hydroelectric 
 302. Id. at 49. 
 303. Eric Wesoff, Energy Storage Needs Better Utility Policy, Language, Culture to 
Succeed, GREENTECH MEDIA (July 28, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ 
energy-storage-needs-change-in-utility-policy-language-and-culture.  
 304. Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C., 95 FERC ¶ 61,476, slip op. at 7 (June 29, 2001).  
 305. Id. at 2.   
 306. See id. at 7. 
 307. Id.  
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facility “is not a source of new energy,” as the energy is converted but 
is not consumed.308  
 In Western Grid Development, L.L.C., FERC classified a proposed 
sodium sulfur battery storage project as a wholesale transmission 
facility.309 Like in Norton Energy, L.L.C., the Commission used 
analogies to other energy facilities to reach its decision. Specifically, 
FERC compared the battery storage “to capacitors in the sense that 
they will be operated to provide electricity to the transmission grid to 
maintain system reliability, rather than to act as an energy or 
capacity resource.”310 However, the Commission emphasized this 
decision was not a general policy determination regarding the 
jurisdiction of battery storage but rather limited to the specific facts 
of the facility at hand.311 These batteries are similar to substation 
equipment already used in many wholesale transmission system 
facilities, will be operated by the California ISO, and will not 
participate in any wholesale electricity markets—all of which are 
characteristics that led FERC to designate them as transmission 
facilities.312 Western Grid will pay retail energy prices when taking 
power from the grid, will receive retail credit when reliability 
concerns trigger a release of energy, and will also “pass through any 
incremental market revenues to customers through a PTO tariff.”313 
Importantly for those who are concerned about double-counting, 
Western Grid will not retain revenues outside of the transmission 
access charge.314  
 Although such case-by-case analyses can carry with them high 
transaction costs, they allow entities to realize one of the benefits of 
uncertainty—flexibility to respond to specific situations in lieu of an 
overbroad, one-size-fits-all approach. As is demonstrated above, they 
also begin to provide factual energy storage scenarios that provide 
benchmarks for analogizing and distinguishing future energy storage 
projects. Although there is disagreement about FERC’s approach to 
energy storage, forcing the issue will provide more opportunities for 
scrutiny and evaluation. The more applicants that use this approach, 
 308. Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).  
 309. Western Grid Development, L.L.C., 133 FERC ¶ 61,029, slip op. at 1 (Oct. 12, 
2010). 
 310. Id. at 6-7. 
 311. Id. at 6 (noting that this is subject to CAISO approval of projects through their 
transmission plan). 
 312. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., supra note 92, at 4; Western Grid Development, 
L.L.C., 130 FERC ¶ 61,056, slip op. at 14 (Jan. 21, 2010). 
 313. Western Grid Development L.L.C., supra note 312, at 7. 
 314. Id. at 15. 
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the broader the precedent for energy storage will grow, establishing 
gradual norms that can narrow the range of uncertainty. 
3.   Develop More Information  
 A last strategy for functioning within the uncertainty is to develop 
more information through enhanced research and development. 
Stakeholders can use the period of uncertainty to gather superior 
information that leads to more effective and accurate 
decisionmaking. This is particularly the case where any harm caused 
by delaying regulatory certainty is surpassed by the benefits of a 
more informed decision.315 As Professor Elliot describes, 
By regulating too soon we may not only regulate the wrong thing, 
but we may regulate in the wrong way. To be more precise, it may 
be that if we had waited a little while, we would have developed 
regulatory tools and techniques that are better by an amount that 
more than compensates for the harm that comes about in the 
meantime.316  
 As much as certainty is valued, many stakeholders might value 
the opportunity to develop more information and shape the rules in a 
way that enhances effectiveness.317 One advantage of withholding 
regulation, and thus creating uncertainty, is that doing so allows 
regulators more time to collect information, refine the purpose and 
feasibility of a law, and facilitate the proper means to implement 
their policies.318 One example can be found in modeling 
advancements. MISO and PJM have independently determined that 
better modeling is required to better assess the role of energy storage 
 315. Elliott, supra note 234, at 264-65 (pointing to the delay in providing regulatory 
certainty regarding acid rain as an example of a delay and period of regulatory uncertainty 
that resulted in better regulation compared to that of climate change).  
 316. Id. at 264; see also Warren G. Lavey, Making and Keeping Regulatory Promises, 
55 FED. COMMS. L.J. 1, 15 (2002) (Even after significant time is spent developing a final 
decision, “the FCC may identify flaws in the rules it adopted from market experience, by 
assessing changing market conditions, by developing a new evaluation of options, or after 
judicial reversal.”). 
 317. See, e.g., Fremeth & Richter, supra note 184, at 146 (arguing that more firms 
should use the advocating response in the face of environmental regulatory uncertainty, in 
which firms advocate for pragmatic, progressive policies, which enable them to shape 
future regulation in their favor). But see the extensive literature on rent-seeking, much of 
which suggests that stakeholders may use this opportunity only to shape rules in a way 
that favors themselves. 
 318. See Elliott, supra note 234, at 263; see also id. at 265 (“When we can afford to, we 
should wait until we understand a problem well enough to develop a sensible, effective 
regulatory approach—rather than rushing off to ‘do something’ as soon as the scientists tell 
us that there is a problem.”). 
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in transmission planning.319 Technology continues to advance to aid 
those in the energy storage community to find a way to integrate 
these multi-faceted services into the existing legal regime.320 To do 
otherwise can have serious consequences. There could be more 
energy storage start-up bankruptcies and more discontent within the 
emerging industry if the agency jumped the gun and regulated before 
more complete information about the value, effects, and integration 
was developed.  
 This information gathering will be helped by recent public and 
private funds that have been earmarked for energy storage and other 
smart grid technologies. On the public level, the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) has received approximately $770 
million since 2009 to support the development of innovative energy 
technologies.321 On the private level, “[a]ccording to a recent survey 
by Ernst & Young, energy storage was the largest segment for 
cleantech investment in the third quarter of 2011, increasing by 
1,932 percent over the same period last year.”322 The Internal 
Revenue Service is also providing a tax credit equal to thirty percent 
of the specified advanced energy property for qualifying advanced 
energy projects.323  
 Political scientists argue that “high regulatory uncertainty 
denotes a lower availability of information on the respective 
regulation than is available under low regulatory uncertainty.”324 
Therefore, as more information develops, stakeholders may serve to 
reduce the uncertainty surrounding energy storage even further. In 
 319. MISO ENERGY STORAGE REPORT, supra note 78, at 1-4 (“MISO needs to improve 
storage modeling.”); see also ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 2 (PJM identifying 
better models as a fundamental need for energy storage); Bhatnagar, supra note 159, at 7. 
 320. “The new software will allow companies and utilities to understand how a given 
storage system could perform multiple functions, creating multiple streams of revenue that 
together allow the owner of the energy storage system to make a profit. It also does an 
analysis of which revenue streams are something that can actually be captured, given 
existing regulations.” Kevin Bullis, Building the Business Case for Energy Storage, MIT 
TECH. REV. (June 14, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/516146/building-the-
business-case-for-energy-storage/. 
 321. ARPA-E Awards $130 Million for 66 Transformational Energy Technology 
Projects, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 28, 2012), http://energy.gov/articles/arpa-e-awards-
130-million-66-transformational-energy-technology-projects. 
 322. KEMA, COPPER DEV. ASS’N, MARKET EVALUATION FOR ENERGY STORAGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 4-1 (2012), available at http://www.copper.org/about/pressreleases/pdfs/ 
kema_report.pdf. 
 323. “Specified advanced energy property” includes property designed for use in the 
production of energy from energy storage systems. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-12, Qualifying 
Advanced Energy Project Credit (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-13-
12.pdf. 
 324. Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 59. 
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short, developers should have sufficient confidence and strategies to 
“power through” the uncertainty associated with energy storage. 
B.   Strategies for Regulators to Narrow the                                   
Range of Regulatory Uncertainty 
 The approaches for stakeholders will be most effective if 
regulators can also work to narrow the range of uncertainty involved 
in energy storage. Although a number of strategies could be 
discussed,325 this section considers two feasible options. First, PUCs 
can reduce cost recovery uncertainty through cost recovery 
protections. Second, FERC can reduce cost and jurisdictional 
uncertainty by providing some parameters to cabin its discretion and 
applying such parameters to produce consistent outcomes. Each of 
these is discussed below.  
1.   Constrain the Regulatory Uncertainty 
 Although mandates were discussed earlier as a way to constrain 
PUC discretion,326 PUCs can also affirmatively act in ways to reduce 
the risks for new technologies. First, state PUCs may be able to 
provide some pre-approval for energy storage applicants in the form 
of a prudence determination.327 As an example, a 2011 Florida law 
required risk reduction, in that “the [PSC] shall provide for full cost 
recovery . . . of all reasonable and prudent costs incurred by a 
provider for renewable energy projects that are zero greenhouse gas 
emitting at the point of generation . . . .”328  
 Second, some PUCs even allow utilities to implement creative 
alternatives to reduce their risk in questionable investments. PUCs 
have allowed “tariffed rates”329 and feed-in-tariffs330 to recover the 
 325. See, e.g., Fabrizio, supra note 182, at 792 (discussing strategies that have been 
proposed to reduce the risk of investment, such as shared risk, and binding the regulatory 
body to make it more costly to change their mind).  
 326. See supra Part IV.A.1.  
 327. JIM LAZAR & DAVID FARNSWORTH, INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS IN 
ELECTRIC RATES 17, 21-22 (2011), available at www.raponline.org/document/download/ 
id/4670; Wiranowski, supra note 206, at 376-77 (“Utilities also face regulatory uncertainty, 
especially regarding cost recovery, so utilities often seek pre-approval from their regulators 
in the form of a prudence determination. . . . For example, if a utility can secure a 
statutorily guaranteed return for particular kinds of investments like renewable energy 
generation, it can avoid the uncertain process of the state regulator’s cost-benefit analysis 
for those investments.”).  
 328. FLA. STAT. § 366.92(4) (2011).  
 329. Public Service Company of New Mexico, N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 10-00037-
UT, 2010 WL 3937778, at *3 (Aug. 31, 2010).  
 330. Feed-in Tariffs, Haw. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, No. 2008-0273, 2009 WL 3756418, at *1 
(Sept. 25, 2009).  
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costs of renewable projects. PUCs have also granted greater weight to 
a utility’s own estimate of costs and potential electricity production of 
a proposed project than an outside statistical estimate.331 So long as 
the utility’s projections have been made in good faith, a utility can 
sometimes assume that its numbers will be presumed legitimate 
instead of being worried that the PUC will always need to conduct its 
own study.332 Other PUCs have approved “spot market prices” that 
lowered consumer’s bills and reduced uncertainty for utilities.333  
2.   Develop Parameters and Apply Them Consistently  
 A second method for regulators to narrow the range of uncertainty 
is for FERC to adopt some limiting principles on its case-by-case 
assessment. For instance, although FERC was loathe to commit to 
specific qualifications, limits, or incentives required during its 
rulemaking on market incentives, FERC did provide three situations 
creating rebuttable presumptions that the requirements of section 
219 are satisfied: (1) transmission projects that result from a fair and 
open regional planning process that considers and evaluates projects 
for reliability and/or congestion and is found to be acceptable to the 
Commission; (2) a proposed project located in a National Interest 
Electric Transmission Corridor; or (3) a project that has received 
construction approval from an appropriate state commission or state 
citing authority.334 If energy storage meets any of these three 
conditions, its proposal for incentive-based rates carry a rebuttable 
presumption of approval.335  
 FERC also provided a number of other relevant parameters that it 
would apply to future decisions. First, FERC interpreted “section 219 
to promote capital investment in a wide range of infrastructure 
investments that can have either reliability or congestion benefits 
rather than investments that have both reliability and congestion 
benefits.”336 Second, applicants are required “to show some nexus 
between the incentives being requested and the investment         
being made, i.e., to demonstrate that the incentives are rationally 
related to the investments being proposed.”337 Third, FERC will not 
 331. See, e.g., Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 70 N.H. P.U.C. 164, 224 
(Apr. 18, 1985).  
 332. See id.  
 333. Retail Electricity Market: End State of Default Service, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
No. 2011-2237952, 2013 WL 652517, at *15 (Feb. 14, 2013).  
 334. FERC Order No. 679, supra note 141, ¶ 58. 
 335. Id.  
 336. Id. ¶ 42. 
 337. Id. ¶ 48. 
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impose size limits on eligible projects or condition approval on 
market power findings.338  
 FERC can develop similar benchmarks for energy storage, 
perhaps taking a functional approach to asset classifications. As 
more cases present themselves, categories will begin to develop     
and certain factual scenarios will become more predictable. If         
the industry can come to anticipate the outcome of these cases, a 
norm will eventually develop that can provide more confidence in 
expected future outcomes. Although there may not be consistency 
across jurisdictions, there should at least be consistency within a 
jurisdiction.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 There is no doubt about the vast potential found in energy storage. 
According to some estimates, “[t]he U.S. energy storage market 
exceeded $1 billion in 2011 and could surpass the $5 billion mark in 
2014.”339 “[A]nnual global demand for grid-scale energy storage will 
reach an astounding 185.4 gigawatt-hours (GWh) by 2017 and 
represent a $113.5 billion incremental revenue opportunity for an 
industry that currently generates sales of $50 to $60 billion a 
year.”340 In 2009, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) awarded 
$185 million of $778 million in smart grid funding to energy storage 
initiatives. DOE loan guarantees have supported many of the energy 
storage projects discussed above,341 and legislation proposing tax 
credits for energy storage technologies continues to be introduced.342  
 338. Id. 
 339. Roberts, supra note 55, at 46. “Lux Research predicts that the demand for grid 
storage applications will grow nearly ninefold from $200 million in 2012 to $10.4 billion in 
2017.” Barbara Vergetis Lundin, Pacific Gas and Electric Launches $3.3M Energy Storage 
System, FIERCEENERGY (May 29, 2013), http://www.fierceenergy.com/story/pacific-gas-and-
electric-launches-33m-energy-storage-system/2013-05-29. 
 340. John Petersen, Grid-Scale Energy Storage: Lux Predicts $113.5 Billion in     
Global Demand by 2017, ALT. ENERGY STOCKS (Apr. 4, 2012, 5:50 AM), 
http://www.altenergystocks.com/archives/2012/04/gridscale_energy_storage_lux_predicts_1
135_billion_in_global_demand_by_2017.html (citing LUX RESEARCH, GRID STORAGE UNDER 
THE MICROSCOPE: USING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE TO FORECAST GLOBAL DEMAND (2012),     
available at http://info.luxresearchinc.com/Portals/86611/docs/research%20downloads/2012/ 
grid%20storage_state-of-the-market-sample.pdf). 
 341. See, e.g., U.S. P’SHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN., THE CLEAN ENERGY 
DEPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (CEDA): KEY ASPECTS & IMPROVEMENTS TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAMS (2011), available at 
http://uspref.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/CEDA-Analysis-2011-v2.0.pdf (cataloguing 
loans made for renewable energy projects, including energy storage, under the DOE’s 
“Section 1705 Program”).   
 342. See, e.g., New Bill Proposes Tax Credits for Renewable Energy Storage, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY INSIGHTS (July 15, 2013), http://www.renewableinsights.com/ 
2013/07/new-bill-proposes-tax-credits-for-renewable-energy-storage (remarking on Senator 
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 To realize its full potential, however, energy storage also needs to 
be integrated into the labyrinth of regulated and restructured energy 
regimes. The uncertainties are numerous. It is unclear whether 
restructured market rules will allow energy storage services to 
compete on even playing fields. If the market rules are amended to 
allow more even competition between energy storage and traditional 
generation assets, it is unclear if the markets will account for the 
variety of energy storage services. It is unclear whether utilities will 
be able to receive compensation through their rates where many 
PUCs are focused on the least-cost alternative. Furthermore, 
different uncertainties are resolved at different times. For instance, 
it has been suggested that uncertainties in restructured markets may 
be resolved more quickly than those in regulated markets.343 It will 
be interesting to see whether California’s utilities respond to the new 
energy storage mandate by obtaining their own resources or whether 
they will contract with Independent Power Producers to fulfill the 
majority of their needs. This Article is not intended to minimize the 
challenges posed by regulatory uncertainty, but to caution our 
response. Without diagnosing the different varieties of uncertainty, 
we run the risk of perpetuating inaction.  
 By characterizing the regulatory uncertainty surrounding energy 
storage, this analysis reveals that it is of a manageable variety, a 
variety that will allow energy storage to develop even within a zone 
of uncertainty. In fall 2004, Navigant Consulting conducted a 
comprehensive survey to solicit the insights of utility leaders into the 
key challenges surrounding regulatory uncertainty and the 
implications on the rate-case and ratemaking activities of gas and 
electric distribution utilities. “The message, heard loud and clear, 
was that regulatory uncertainty is real and remains one of the most 
critical issues in the North American energy industry. It must be 
better managed.”344 
Wyden’s introduction of The Storage Technology for Renewable and Green Energy Act of 
2013, S. 1030, 113th Cong. (2013), and predecessor proposals that were introduced in 2009, 
2010, and 2011). 
 343. See Sydney Kaufman et al., Electricity Storage in Regulated Markets: Getting the 
Rules Right, ELEC. J., July 2011, at 63, 63-64. 
 344. Russell A. Feingold, Utilities and Regulators: A Search for Harmony, PUB.         
UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 2005, available at http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2005/ 
11/utilities-and-regulators-search-harmony. 
                                                                                                                                        
